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This thesis studies equilibrium asset prices and variance risk premia (VRP) with
three classes of models: consumption-based (Chapter 2), production-based (Chapter
3) and demand-based (Chapter 4 ) asset pricing models.
In Chapter 2, we provide a complete solution to the problem of equilibrium asset
pricing in a pure exchange economy with two types of heterogeneous investors hav-
ing higher/lower risk aversion. Using a perturbation method, we obtain analytical
approximate formulas for the optimal consumption-sharing rule, which is numeri-
cally justified to be accurate for a large risk aversion and heterogeneity. We present
analytical formulas for the equilibrium pricing function, Sharpe ratio, risk-free rate,
stock price and optimal trading strategies. We then analyse the properties of the
equilibrium and derive some testable hypotheses, which enhance our understand-
ing on the economics of financial markets.
In Chapter 3, we provide a production-based equilibrium model with a recursive-
preferences investor, which successfully explains the equity premium puzzle with
very low risk aversion, and theoretically generates the negative sign of the diffusive
volatility risk premium. The empirical results show that all models can perfectly
explain the equity premium puzzle, and that the stochastic volatility with contem-
poraneous jumps (SVCJ) model and the stochastic volatility with jumps in volatility
(SVJV) model built on our cost-free production economy can well capture both the
large equity and variance risk premiums only if the annualized equity premium is
at or larger than 11% (e.g., the periods, 1990–1999 and 2010–2016).
Chapter 4 is the first to provide a demand-based equilibrium model of volatility
trading with three kinds of traders – dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds –
which complements Eraker and Wu’s (2017) consumption-based equilibrium model.
Our theoretical results are consistent with existing empirical observations, and two
ii
endogenous cases reach the same conclusion. Our novel model links together risk
aversion, market price of the volatility risk, VRP, VIX futures price and return and
futures trading activities. This allows us to test empirically the impact of the three
traders’ net positions on the VRP and the VIX futures return.
iii
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During the period between September 2011 and June 2014, I was studying in a Mas-
ter of Management, Operations Research and Management program, specializing
in Financial Mathematics and Financial Engineering at Southwestern University of
Finance and Economics (SWUFE) in P. R. China. At the end of the first semester in
2012, I made up my mind to pursue a career of being a scholar, as I thought it would
be an enjoyable life. With this aspiration, I worked very hard in doing research. Af-
ter reading a large number of papers, I published 10 papers in good SCI-indexed
journals, including Applied Mathematics and Computation, Journal of Computational and
Applied Mathematics, and Communications in Mathematical Sciences. In April 2013, I
first learned the name of Professor Jin Zhang, when I was reading his much-cited
paper: Zhang, Zhao, and Chang (2012). In order to deeply understand his paper, I
asked him some research questions via emails. After several rounds of email com-
munications, I expressed my interest in being a PhD student under his supervision.
Finally, with an academic career in my mind and his warm encouragement, I decided
to apply to enter the PhD program at the University of Otago (UO). I was awarded
the UO Doctoral Scholarship in August 2014, and then I accepted and started my
PhD program in November 2014.
After I enrolled in UO, I started to read and search PhD topics. Equilibrium
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asset pricing is an active research topic in continuous-time finance. The topic is diffi-
cult due to its high demand for advanced mathematics. Finance scholars have been
working very hard in explaining the large equity premium puzzle and negative vari-
ance risk premium by developing equilibrium models in different kinds of economy.
After a few rounds of discussion with my supervisor, and judging from my previous
experience of research in the area of applied mathematics, we determined the topic
of my PhD thesis: Equilibrium Asset Prices and Variance Risk Premia. Along the process
of doing this topic, I have studied three different classes of asset pricing models (i.e.,
consumption-based, production-based and demand-based models).
1.1 Background
Asset pricing models have been developed, starting with the capital asset pricing
models (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964); Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). The most pop-
ular are the consumption-based asset pricing models, which assume that investors
attempt to smooth consumption, given their information on the future distribution
of asset returns and then use marginal rates of substitution (i.e., stochastic discount
factor) to determine the prices of assets. The classical equilibrium models study a
representative (single-agent) economy with the same aggregate consumption series
as the heterogeneous-agent economy and the same asset price functions (e.g., Lu-
cas (1978); Mehra and Prescott (1985); Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Wang (1996) stud-
ies a simple pure exchange economy with two classes of investors who have time-
additive, state-independent, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences with
risk-aversion coefficients and uses it to discuss the term structure of interest rates.
Later on, several papers are along this extension (e.g., Bhamra and Uppal (2014);
Chabakauri (2015)). In Chapter 2, by using a perturbation method, we provide the
complete solution with very good accuracy to the equilibrium in a pure exchange
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economy with two heterogeneous investors.
The consumption-based asset pricing models are built in a pure exchange or en-
dowment economy, in which the consumption processes are exogenously given. An
important application of these models is to explain the equity premium puzzle (see,
e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985); Rietz (1988); Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Recently, sev-
eral papers further uses it to explain the VRP (see, e.g., Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou
(2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015)). In production-based
asset pricing models, the consumption processes are endogenously solved. Fol-
lowing the same application of the consumption-based asset pricing models, these
production-based models are also used to explain the equity premium puzzle, (e.g.,
Constantinides (1990); Cochrane (1991); Zhang et al. (2012); Jahan-Parvar and Liu
(2014); Hirshleifer, Li, and Yu (2015)). However, there is little literature studying the
VRP in a production economy. Chapter 3 fills this gap.
There are few papers studying the demand-based equilibrium model. For ex-
ample, Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2009) propose a demand-based equi-
librium model (which is a two-trader model) for option pricing. Chapter 4 develops
their two-trader model into a three-trader model, in which there are three kinds of
traders (i.e., dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds) and uses it to analyse how
the traders’ demand influences the volatility market.
1.2 Structure of this PhD thesis
Chapter 2-Chapter 4 in this thesis comprise three independent but related papers.
Table 1.1 summarizes the details of the three chapters and the contribution made by
the candidate.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 1. Introduction 5
I previously focused on the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a) production econ-
omy. However, the main stream finance literature focuses more on an exchange
economy, i.e., consumption-based asset pricing. After a comprehensive study of
the literature on consumption-based models, my supervisor and I decided to focus
our attention on MIT Professor Jiang Wang’s (1996) problem, i.e., modelling equi-
librium asset pricing in a pure exchange economy with two types of heterogeneous
investors having higher/lower risk aversion. Using a perturbation method initially
developed in engineering science, we obtained an analytical approximate formula
for the consumption-sharing rule between two types of investors. Compared with
Wang’s (1996) closed-form solution for two specific risk-aversion coefficients and
Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) analytical solution in a series form, our approximate for-
mula gives accurate numerical values of consumption for a wide range of model
parameters. Because of the complexity of their consumption rules, Wang (1996) only
studies bond price model, and Bhamra and Uppal (2014) only handles a stock with
a single dividend. Our solution is more intuitive and easier to use. With this advan-
tage, we are able to solve the general equilibrium for the stock model completely. In
August 2015, I finished a paper jointly with my supervisor, Asset Pricing in a Pure
Exchange Economy with Heterogeneous Investors, and submitted it to the Auckland Fi-
nance Meeting for presentation. The paper was accepted (75 out of 200 submissions
were accepted) and presented in December 2015. Currently, the paper is under re-
view by a good journal for publication. This is the first essay of my PhD thesis.
After finishing a paper on the consumption-based asset pricing model, I contin-
ued my research journey on studying a production-based asset pricing model and
it’s application on VRP. The recent papers on this topic published in top journals, in-
cluding Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015) are mainly consumption-
based equilibrium models with long-run risks and stochastic volatility. I also studied
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the recent development on production-based Q-theory models, e.g., Columbia Pro-
fessor Neng Wang’s papers, which feature more on illiquid capital and have a less
clean result in explaining either equity or VRP. Judging from the status quo, after a
discussion with my supervisor, we decided to extend our own cost-free production-
based model (Zhang et al. (2012)), from constant relative risk aversion to Epstein and
Zin (1991) recursive preference, and from constant volatility to stochastic volatility
with jumps in both stock and volatility that was popular in finance literature, see
e.g, Broadie et al. (2007). With some effort, we obtained closed-form solutions for
both instantaneous equity risk premium and VRP. After estimating model parame-
ters in physical measure using Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) simulation, we
were able to examine the impact of risk-aversion and elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution on the VRP. In August 2016, I finished a paper jointly with my supervisor,
Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-Free Production Economy, and
submitted it to the Auckland Finance Meeting for presentation. The paper was ac-
cepted (85 out of 200 submissions were accepted) and presented in December 2016.
Currently, the paper is under review by a top journal for publication. This is the
second essay of my PhD thesis.
In August 2016, I was invited to review a paper on VIX futures markets. During
the process of reviewing the paper, I took note of the data of the three main kinds
of traders, dealers (market makers), asset managers (hedgers) and leveraged funds
(speculators), published by U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
in the Commitments of Traders reports, which are available from the CFTC. I got
excited about the trading mechanism between the traders, and wanted to develop
a demand-based equilibrium model using a setup similar to Kyle (1985) model.
I therefore obtained closed-form solutions for three different equilibrium settings.
Three demand-based equilibrium models, respectively, link the market price of volatil-
ity risk with the traders’ positions, which allows us to empirically test the impact of
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the three traders’ net positions on the VRP and the VIX futures return. In March 2017,
I finished a paper jointly with my supervisor, A Demand-Based Equilibrium Model
of Volatility Trading. We revised the paper after collecting feedback from seminar
presentations at a few international universities, and then submitted it to the 2017
Auckland Finance Meeting for presentation. The paper now has been accepted by
the meeting. This is the third essay of my PhD thesis.
Three working papers discussed above can be summarized as follows.
[1] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2015, Asset Pricing in a Pure Exchange Econ-
omy with Heterogeneous Investors, Presented at 2015 Auckland Finance Meet-
ing and 2016 New Zealand Finance Colloquium. [Chapter 2]
[2] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2016, Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk
Premiums in a Cost-free Production Economy, Presented at 2016 Auckland Fi-
nance Meeting. [Chapter 3]
[3] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2016, A Demand-Based Equilibrium Model of
Volatility Trading, Accepted for presentation at 2017 Auckland Finance Meeting.
[Chapter 4]
1.3 Contributions of this PhD thesis
Compared with the existing closed-form solutions of the equilibrium model with
two agents, in Chapter 2, we give an explicit solution for all variables, including the
stock price and the trading strategies and derive an aggregate risk aversion formula
that reveals the aggregate mechanism of two investors. The simple solution in the
chapter has more explanatory power than the complicated and long closed-form
solutions which lose the original economic intuition.
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There are at least two contributions in Chapter 3. First, we develop a cost-
free production-based equilibrium model as the first production-based equilibrium
model to explain the equity premium puzzle and the large negative VRP. Second, we
provide guidance on the sign of the diffusive volatility risk premium (DVRP) based
on the SVCJ model.
In Chapter 4, the first contribution is that this is the first chapter to provide a
demand-based equilibrium model of volatility trading with three kinds of traders
(i.e., dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds) that fully supports the existing
empirical results. Due to our novel model, the second contribution we make is that
this chapter is the first to test the impact of the three main traders’ net positions on
the VRP and the VIX futures return.
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Chapter 2
Asset Pricing in a Pure Exchange
Economy with Heterogeneous
Investors
This chapter is joint work with Jin E. Zhang. Its earlier version was presented at 2015
Auckland Finance Meeting, 17-19 December 2015, AUT, Auckland, New Zealand;
and 2016 New Zealand Finance Colloquium, 11-12 February 2016, University of
Otago, Queenstown, New Zealand.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an intuitive solution to the problem of asset pricing in a pure
exchange economy with two types of heterogeneous investors. Unlike the classi-
cal equilibrium model with one representative investor (e.g., Lucas (1978)), the two
agents share risks by exchanging their goods in the economy. Hence, there exist op-
timal trading strategies and equilibrium asset prices. This equilibrium model has
many economic implications, such as modelling a competitive market in microeco-
nomics, the evaluation of economic policy in macroeconomics and asset pricing in
Chapter 2. Asset Pricing in a Pure Exchange Economy with Heterogeneous
Investors
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finance. Our neat analytical expressions intuitively provide comparative statics for
the effects of heterogeneity in risk-aversion and heterogeneity in initial wealth.
There are already several papers available that provide a closed-form solution.
Wang (1996) provides a solution for specific sets of risk-aversion coefficients (i.e., 0.5
and 1), with the stock price given as the solution to an ordinary differential equa-
tion. Longstaff and Wang (2012) extend Wang’s (1996) model into a more general
setting of risk-aversion coefficients (i.e., γ and 2γ) and solve the solution in terms of
hyper-geometric functions. Cvitanić, Jouini, Malamud, and Napp (2012) discuss the
bounds of the equilibrium in a pure exchange economy in which agents differ with
respect to both beliefs and their preference parameters. Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
provide a closed-form solution for the economy which is similar to Cvitanić et al.’s
(2012). Their solution is based on infinite Taylor expansions and yields solutions
based on hyper-geometric functions. Moreover, Chabakauri (2013, 2015) provide so-
lutions for economies with heterogeneity in risk-aversion and portfolio constraints
which are typically based on solutions to hypergeometric functions.1
Compared with the above existing closed-form solutions, we do make several
contributions. Firstly, compared with Wang (1996), we give an explicit solution
for the stock price and explicitly solve the trading strategies for heterogeneous in-
vestors. In addition, we generalize the range of risk aversion in Wang (1996); Longstaff
and Wang (2012). Secondly, we give a complete solution of the equilibrium rather
than the limit bounds in Cvitanić et al. (2012). Thirdly, in Bhamra and Uppal (2014),
as the limitation of their complicated solution, they only solve the price of dividend
strip. In the chapter, we give a very intuitive solution for the price of the stock
yielding multiple or continuous dividends. Fourthly, in contrast to Chabakauri
1Other literature studies on heterogeneous investors with margin constraints. Gârleanu and Ped-
ersen (2011) study a model with heterogeneous-risk-aversion agents facing margin constraints and
discuss how margin constraints affect capital market equilibrium. Rytchkov (2014) develops constant
margin constraints in Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) into time-varying case.
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(2013, 2015), our crystally clear aggregate risk aversion formula reveals the aggre-
gate mechanism of two investors. The simple solution in the chapter has more ex-
planatory power than the complicated and long closed-form solutions which lose the
original economic intuition. Finally, besides discussing the effect of the risk-aversion
heterogeneity, this chapter also discusses the effect of the size of investors, that re-
veals how the heterogeneity and the heterogeneous investors’ proportion influence
the equilibrium together.
Using a perturbation method,2 we provide the complete solution with very good
accuracy to the optimal consumption-sharing rule, pricing function, Sharpe ratio,
risk-free rate, stock price (in a long-lived version) and optimal trading strategies
in a pure exchange economy with two heterogeneous investors. All perturbation
expansions for the equilibrium are simple and tractable. The effects of risk aversion
heterogeneity and the size of investors on the equilibrium are clearly explained by
using our approximate solutions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our
model of an exchange economy with heterogeneous agents and the definition of the
equilibrium. Section 2.3 presents our solution to the equilibrium and analyses its
properties. Section 2.4 concludes. Appendix 2.5.1 presents the explicit solution for
our maximization problem using Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) method. Appendix
2.5.2 collects all proofs and Appendix 2.5.3 provides an extension of the results.
2.2 Model setup and market equilibrium
2.2.1 Model setup
We consider a pure exchange economy with an infinite horizon. There are two assets
in this economy: one risk-free asset (a bond) in zero net supply with the risk-free
2The same method is used by Kogan and Uppal (2001) to analyse a heterogenous-agent economy
in the presence of portfolio constraints.
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interest rate rt determined in the equilibrium, and one risky asset (a stock) St in net
supply of one unit. In addition, the risky asset produces a consumption good paid
as a dividend Dt at time t ∈ [0,∞). We assume the flow of the dividend Dt follows
a geometric Brownian motion,
dDt = Dt (µdt+ σDdBt) , (2.1)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion defined on the complete probability space
(Ω,F , P ). The initial value D0 > 0, the drift µ ≥ 0 and the volatility σD > 0 are
constant.
There are two types of heterogeneous investors,H andL. They have constant rel-







where δ > 0 is the time discount parameter and is the same across the two types
of heterogeneous investors, and ci,t is the consumption of the type i investors. In
addition, we assume risk aversion γH > γL > 0. Following Gârleanu and Peder-
sen (2011) and Rytchkov (2014), one implication of our model is that type H agents
can be regarded as retail investors who are averse to risk and of type L agents as
institutional investors who are risk-seeking. Based on the following analysis, the
heterogeneity in investor preferences plays a crucial role in the economy.
In this market, heterogeneous investors continuously trade in the two assets.
Given initial wealth Wi,0 > 0, the type i investors choose their consumption-trading
strategies {ci, φi, ψi} in consumption, stock and bond, respectively. The wealth pro-
cess of type i agents, Wi,t, at time t is subject to,
dWi,t =ψi,trtdt+ φi,t (Dtdt+ dSt)− ci,tdt, (2.3)
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with initial wealth WH,0 = (1− β)S0 and WL,0 = βS0, where β ∈ (0, 1). The param-
eter β represents the (initial) fraction or size of type L investors in the economy.
Type i investors maximize their expected objective function by choosing consumption-











s.t. Equation (2.3). (2.4)
As cH,t and cL,t are aggregate equilibrium consumption streams of the two types
of investors, the sum of them is less than the total consumption good (paid as a
dividend) Dt. In other words, cH,t + cL,t ≤ Dt for t ∈ [0,∞).
2.2.2 Market equilibrium
We follow the definition of a market equilibrium in Wang (1996) and present it as
follows:
Definition 2.2.1 (market equilibrium (Wang (1996))) Equilibrium in our economy is
defined in a standard way: equilibrium consumption-trading strategies {ci, φi, ψi} and the
pair of asset prices {St, rt} are such that type i investors maximize their expected objective
function in (2.4), and markets clear, that is,
φH,t + φL,t = 1, (2.5)
ψH,t + ψL,t = 0. (2.6)
In order to solve this equilibrium, following Wang (1996), we first solve the
Pareto-optimal allocations and then, given Pareto-optimal allocations, an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium can be derived that supports the allocations.
When both types of investors have positive initial wealth Wi,0 > 0, a consump-
tion pair {cH , cL} is Pareto optimal if and only if there is a constant λ ∈ (0, 1) such
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, s.t. cH,t + cL,t ≤ Dt. (2.7)
Here, the parameter λ is the weight of type H investors in the welfare function
to be maximized. Wang (1996) states that maximizing the above expected intertem-
poral welfare function is equivalent to maximizing the welfare function period by













Denoting b = 1−λλ ∈ (0,+∞), which is the ratio of the weight of type L investors
in the welfare function to the weight of type H investors in the welfare function, the












Following Wang (1996), we define a representative investor who has the same utility
function as in the maximization problem (2.9), that is,










In order to define an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, we assume that, given b ∈
(0,+∞) and the corresponding Pareto-optimal allocations {ĉH , ĉL} for the maxi-
mization problem (2.9), the marginal utility of the representative investor can be
3Unlike the incomplete information model (Basak (2005)) in which λ is stochastic as investors face
the different state price densities, in our complete information model, λ should be constant (e.g., Wang
(1996); Bhamra and Uppal (2009)).
4A solution to (2.9), based upon the method of Bhamra and Uppal (2014), is provided in Appendix
2.5.1.

















In addition, the stochastic process of the marginal utility can be written as
dMt
Mt
= −rtdt− θtdBt, (2.12)
where θt is the Sharpe ratio.
Definition 2.2.2 (Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (Wang (1996))) Given b ∈ (0,+∞) and
the corresponding Pareto-optimal allocations {ĉH , ĉL} for the maximization problem (2.9),
there exists an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium that leads to the same allocation, with the pricing
function given by pt = Mt/M0, t ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, in this Arrow-Debreu equilibrium,



















Investors optimally choose the consumption plan {ĉH , ĉL}, financed respectively by budget-
feasible trading strategies and the securities market clears.
2.3 Main results
2.3.1 Optimal consumptions
In terms of the maximization problem (2.9) with heterogeneous risk aversion, its
first-order condition becomes c−γHH,t = b (Dt − cH,t)
−γL . Although Bhamra and Uppal
(2014) have employed Lagrange’s theorem to solve the type H investors’ consump-
tion cH,t, their explicit expression is too complicated because it is written in terms of
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infinite Taylor expansions (see Appendix 2.5.1).56 Our target is to analyse the equi-
librium asset prices and trading strategies in a pure exchange economy with two
heterogeneous investors. Based on this, we use perturbation methods which rely
on there being a dimensionless parameter in the problem that is relatively small:
1  ε > 0. We assume that γH = γ(1 + ε), γL = γ(1 − ε). Here ε is the risk-averse
heterogeneity and γ is the mean risk aversion in the market. Furthermore, we as-
sume γ and δ satisfy δ−µ(1−γ)+ 12σ
2
Dγ(1−γ) > 0 to guarantee St > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ].
In addition, δ − µ(1− γi) + 12σ
2
Dγi(1− γi) > 0 for i ∈ {H,L} as both the cases where
the type H or L investors accumulate all the wealth must be considered. Then the












The first-order condition derives
Dt − cH,t = b1/γ ((Dt − cH,t)cH,t)ε cH,t. (2.15)
By using perturbation methods, the solutions of Equation (2.15) are given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.3.1 (Pareto-optimal consumption allocations) 7 Given b ∈ (0,+∞),
the corresponding Pareto-optimal consumption allocations {ĉH , ĉL} for the maximization
5If we substitute Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) solutions of our model in Appendix 2.5.1 into the def-
inition of the marginal utility of the representative investor in (2.11) and then solve the marginal utility,
we will find that it is very difficult to explicitly solve the equilibrium price of long-lived stock (2.13).
This is because the marginal utility is with respect to the γH th (or γLth) power of a hypergeometric
function.
6Without a loss of generality, we only compare our solution with Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) as
the closed solutions of Chabakauri (2013, 2015) have the same accuracy.
7The perturbation method can be applied in solving the equilibrium in a more general settings,
such as the case of heterogeneity in time discount factors and heterogeneity in assessment of the div-
idend mean growth rates. The details involving a lot of algebra will be presented in a subsequent
research.
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+ 2 lnDt, a = b
1/γ .
Pareto-optimal consumption allocations in Proposition 2.3.1 are in second-order.
If we remove ε2 terms, they will become first-order perturbation solutions. In order
to verify the accuracy of our solutions in Proposition 2.3.1, we compare them with
Wang’s (1996) exact solutions with particular parameters. Following Wang’s (1996)
parameters, we set γ = 3/4, ε = 1/3 (i.e., γH = 1, γL = 1/2). Moreover, we take
b = 1.7 as β = 67%9. Without loss of generality, we only compare the consumption
of type H investors, which is given in Figure 2.1.10
8Following Wang (1996), we focus on the consumption rate rather than the consumption over
dividend (income) ratio. Based on the solutions in equations (16)-(17), it does not make any difference
using either one.
9According to Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), the proportion of institutional investors
in the U.S. public equity market in 2010 is 67 %.






1 + 4b2Dt − 1),
and Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) solution is given in Appendix 2.5.1.
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Panel A. The consumption of type H investors
Wang (1996)/Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
First-order
Second-order











Panel B. The consumption of type H investors
Wang (1996)/Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
Second-order
Figure 2.1: The consumption of type H investors based on
Wang’s (1996) setup.
This figure shows the value of type H investors’ consumption by using first-order and
second-order approximations in our chapter and using Wang’s (1996) and Bhamra and
Uppal’s (2014) solutions. Dividend is in amount. The model parameters are as follows:
γ = 3/4, ε = 1/3 and b = 1.7.
Figure 2.1 shows the second-order perturbation solution is better than the first-
order one, but the first-order perturbation solution is good enough to approximate
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Wang’s (1996) exact solution against small dividend value (less than 2.5) in Panel A.
The second-order perturbation solution works so well even for large dividend value
(around 40) in Panel B, Figure 2.1. Based on that, we can claim that our second-order
perturbation solution is a very good approximation for Wang’s (1996) problem.
In order to examine whether our perturbation solutions can handle the large
risk-averse heterogeneity cases, we keep ε = 1/3 and then γH and γL are scaled
by γ. Here ε = 1/3 indicates that γH is the double of γL. For example, γH = 20
and γL = 10. Figure 2.3 gives the numerical results. From Panel A-D, Figure 2.3,
even for large dividend value (around 40), the second-order perturbation solution
gets a very accurate approximation for the explicit solution in Bhamra and Uppal
(2014) and the accuracy is most likely not changed by γ. Thus, we can know that our
perturbation solutions (e.g., the second-order solution) can well handle the large
risk-averse heterogeneity cases.
Chapter 2. Asset Pricing in a Pure Exchange Economy with Heterogeneous
Investors
20











Panel A. γH = 1, γL = 0.5
Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
Second-order











Panel B. γH = 5, γL = 2.5
Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
Second-order











Panel C. γH = 10, γL = 5
Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
Second-order











Panel D. γH = 20, γL = 10
Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
Second-order
Figure 2.3: The consumption of type H investors with differ-
ent γ.
This figure shows the value of type H investors’ consumption by using first-order and
second-order approximations in our chapter and using Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) solu-






γ = γH+γL2 .
In addition, we want to investigate how large risk-averse heterogeneity our per-
turbation solutions can address. As the accuracy is most likely not changed by γ,
without a loss of generality, we set γ = 10 and get Figure 2.5 which plots the per-
turbation solutions against risk-averse heterogeneity ε. In a small dividend value,
based on Figure 2.5, both the first-order and second-order perturbation solutions can
well fit the Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) explicit solution. For both large risk-averse
heterogeneity settings ε = 0.2 (i.e., γH = 12 and γL = 8) and ε = 0.4 (i.e., γH = 14
and γL = 6) in Figure 2.5, the perturbation solutions give very good approximations
for Dt < 2.
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Panel A. ε = 0.2 ( γH = 12, γL = 8)
Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
First-order
Second-order













Panel B. ε = 0.4 ( γH = 14, γL = 6)
Bhamra and Uppal (2014)
First-order
Second-order
Figure 2.5: The consumption of type H investors with differ-
ent ε.
This figure shows the value of type H investors’ consumption by using first-order and
second-order approximations in our chapter and using Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) solu-






Based on the above comparison, we conclude that our perturbation solutions
can accurately approximate Wang’s (1996) and Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) explicit
solutions. In addition, our perturbation solutions can handle not only large but also
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extremely large risk-averse heterogeneity cases. However, compared to closed-form
solution in Wang (1996); Chabakauri (2013); Bhamra and Uppal (2014); Chabakauri
(2015), in the next section, we will see that our perturbation solutions generate very
intuitive solutions for other variables in the equilibrium.
2.3.2 Equilibrium
By using the Pareto-optimal consumption allocations, we derive an Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium as defined in Definition 2. In this Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, equilib-
rium asset prices, the pricing function, the Sharpe ratio and optimal trading strate-
gies can be analytically solved. Because the expressions in the second-order are very
long, in order to reveal economic intuition, we have decided to present our per-
turbation solutions in the first-order in the main text of the chapter and leave the
second-order solutions in Appendix 2.5.3.11
Proposition 2.3.2 (Equilibrium) Given an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as defined in Def-
inition 2.2.2, there exists a market equilibrium in which the solutions for the equilibrium
prices of traded securities are given by
r = δ + µγ − 1
2














































ξ = δ − µ(1− γ) + 1
2
σ2Dγ(1− γ);
11The only difference between the first-order and second-order perturbation solutions is that the
risk-free rate and the price-dividend ratio are no longer constant. More details see Appendix 2.5.3.
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Dt +O(ε2), ψ̂L,t = −ψ̂H,t; (2.26)
12Corresponding to Wang (1996), the trading strategies are expressed by the unique state variable
Dt rather than Wi,t or St. However, our solution are more explicit than Wang (1996) as St is solved in
(2.19).
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+ 2 lnDt, a = b
1/γ .
Remark 2.3.1 Although we keep all perturbation solutions in first-order, our per-
turbation solutions lead to a complete solution to the equilibrium. Firstly, Wang
(1996) obtains exact solutions for Pareto-optimal consumption allocations; however,
the equilibrium stock price is given as a single integration following an ordinary dif-
ferential equation, and it is not convenient to use Wang’s solution in discussing the
market equilibrium. In addition, substituting Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) solution
for consumption strategies in Appendix 2.5.1 into the marginal utility of the repre-
sentative investor defined by (2.11), we find the marginal utility is a power function
in terms of infinite Taylor expansions, which is too difficult to solve for the price
of the long-lived stock. In this chapter, using a perturbation method, we solve the
two-agent equilibrium model completely and provide the first complete solution to
the equilibrium, including the optimal consumption rule, pricing function, Sharpe
ratio, risk-free interest rate, stock price and optimal trading strategies. Finally, this
chapter combines two factors the size of investors and heterogeneity to study their
influence on the equilibrium.
13Given β, γ and ε, we can solve a from a quadratic equation in (2.28) so that b can be determined
by β, γ and ε.
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Remark 2.3.2 In Proposition 2.3.2, the risk-free interest rate is constant.14 In the ab-
sence of risk-averse heterogeneity ε, the risk-free interest rate r = δ+µγ− 12σ
2
Dγ(γ+








r decreases with the risk-averse heterogeneity in the economy, and vice versa. One
situation is that fixing µ− 12σ
2
D(2γ + 1) > 0 and setting b > 1 (equivalently, a > 1), r
decreases with ε. In other words, in a financial market with a large presence of type
L investors, higher risk-averse heterogeneity reduces the risk-free interest rate. If
µ− 12σ
2
D(2γ+1) > 0 is fixed, then r decreases with the weight ratio b in the economy.
Remark 2.3.3 The price-dividend ratio (or the stock price) is time-varying, and its
volatility is constant and equals σD, from Equation (2.19).15 Given µ+ 12σ
2
D−σ2Dγ > 0,
if the weight ratio b > 1 (which mean type L investors relatively dominate the finan-
cial market), the price-dividend ratio increases with the risk-averse heterogeneity ε,
and vice versa. In addition, the weight ratio b always pushes up the price-dividend
ratio because the size of type L investors determines the weight ratio which can be
regarded as a measure of the size, and the price-dividend ratio is a good measure for
the P/E ratio. Thus, we can understand it as the larger size of institutions (or firms)
deriving higher P/E ratio.
Remark 2.3.4 The Sharpe ratio is constant in Equation (2.21). In the homogeneous
case, the Sharpe ratio θ = γσD, which corresponds to the benchmark case ε = 0.
If b > 1 (equivalently, a > 1), the Sharpe ratio decreases with the risk-averse het-
erogeneity, and vice versa. Furthermore, the Sharpe ratio decreases with the weight
ratio b in the economy.







ξ > 0, the stock investment of type
L investors, φ̂L,t, goes up with an increase both the risk-averse heterogeneity and the
14 The risk-free interest rate in the second-order approximation is stochastic. More details see Ap-
pendix 2.5.3.
15 The volatility in the second-order approximation is not constant. More details see Appendix
2.5.3.
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weight ratio b in the economy. The risk-free asset investment of type L investors is
always negative for any ε > 0. This means that type L investors are always levered.
Moreover, higher risk-averse heterogeneity brings higher leverage (borrowing) for
type L investors from Equation (2.26).
Remark 2.3.6 Investors’ optimal consumption shares are stochastic and are with re-
spect to ht. If ht < 0 (b is extremely large), type L investors’ consumption share sL
decreases with the risk-averse heterogeneity, and vice versa. Obviously, from Equa-
tion (2.27), type L investors’ consumption share increases with the weight ratio.
Remark 2.3.7 The weight ratio b is restricted by Equation (2.28), which reveals the
relationship among β, ε and b. If b = 1, ε > 0, then β > 0.5. Alternatively, if β =
0.5, ε > 0, then b > 1. Given β ∈ (0, 1), b decreases with the risk-averse heterogeneity
ε. Obviously, b increases with β. All solutions in Proposition 2.3.2 are related to the
weight ratio b, which is dominated by the size of typeL investors β. This is consistent
with the empirical evidence that financial institutions (as typeL investors) matter for
asset pricing (Allen (2001) and Blume and Keim (2012)).
2.3.3 Aggregate risk aversion.
As there exist two types of investors, how they aggregate their risk aversion is a
interesting question. Based on the definition of the representative investor, her/his











Plugging (2.20) into (2.29), we get the aggregate risk aversion of the market,
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=(1− β)γH + βγL +O(ε2). (2.31)
Remark 2.3.8 Equation (2.31) provides an exact aggregate rule for γA and reveal an
economic intuition that the weighted average risk aversion using initial wealth ratio
as the weight. This aggregating mechanism is true for the second-order solution
(see Appendix 2.5.3). In addition, if β → 0, then b → 0 and γA → γH ; if β → 1, then
b→∞ and γA → γL.
Remark 2.3.9 In (2.31), the aggregate risk aversion γA decreases with b. This shows
that more risk-seeking type L investors in the market lead to lower aggregate risk
aversion. Furthermore, when b > 1 (equivalently, a > 1), γA decreases with the
risk-averse heterogeneity ε, and vice versa. In other words, the higher risk-averse
heterogeneity changes the type L investors have lower risk aversion and the type
H investors have a higher one. Due to there being more type L investors in the
economy, the aggregate risk aversion γA decreases.
The formula of the aggregate risk aversion in Equation (2.31) can intuitively explain
the effects of the size of type L investors and risk-averse heterogeneity. In the homo-
geneous (aggregate) risk-aversion in Lucas (1978), a higher risk aversion leads to a
higher equity risk premium, a higher Sharpe ratio and a lower stock price. Equation
16The second equality is proved by using the restricted equation of the weight ratio b in (2.28).
17By using Equation (2.21) and the fact that the volatility of the stock is σD , the equity premium





γσ2D + O(ε2) = γAσ2D + O(ε2) which is equivalent to the results solved
in the classical equilibrium model with one representative investor (see Mehra and Prescott (1985)). It
shows that our model can not fully explain the equity premium puzzle. However, the main target of
the chapter is to explore how the size of type L investors and risk-averse heterogeneity influence the
prices of the assets and investments.
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(2.31) indicates a lower b or a lower (higher) ε with b > (<)1 leads to a higher risk
aversion, a higher Sharpe ratio and a lower stock price. It intuitively explains the
effects of the size of type L investors and risk-averse heterogeneity in Figure 2.7 and
Figure 2.11, respectively. Crucially, whether the price goes up or down depends on
which type of the investors dominate.
2.3.4 Properties of the equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyse the equilibrium effects of the size of type L investors β
and the risk-averse heterogeneity ε on asset prices and optimal consumption strate-
gies to understand the economics in financial markets. In terms of the parameters in
this chapter, we set D0 = 1, µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02, t = 20, Dt =
1.43.18
Effects of the size of type L investors β.
In the benchmark homogeneous case (i.e., ε = 0), the risk-free interest rate and the
Sharpe ratio are constant and not related to the size of type L investors. This means
that if type H and L investors are homogeneous, the risk-free interest rate and the
Sharpe ratio are only influenced by their common time discount parameter, com-
mon risk aversion and the parameters of the dividend process. Moreover, the price-






a monotonically increasing function with respect to β ∈ (0, 1). The results are pre-
sented in Figure 2.7 with a dashed line.
18Here we set E[Dt] = D0eµt = 1.43 as the value of Dt.
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Figure 2.7: Effects of the size of type L investors β.
Panel A plots the ratio of the weight of type L investors in the welfare function over the
weight of type H investors in the welfare function b against the size of type L investors β.
Panel B plots the equilibrium Sharpe ratio θ against the faction of type L investors in the
economy. Panels C and D plot the equilibrium asset prices: risk-free interest rate r and the
price-dividend ratio V , respectively. The solid (blue) line corresponds to the equilibrium
with heterogeneous investors; the dashed (red) line corresponds to an equilibrium in the
benchmark homogeneous economy. The plots are typical. The models parameters are as
follows: D0 = 1, µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, ε = 1/3, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02, t = 20.
In an economy with two heterogeneous investors, Figure 2.7, Panel A shows that
the larger size of type L investors (e.g., β = 0.8) makes them have higher weight in
the welfare function than the smaller size of type L investors (e.g., β = 0.2). Figure
2.7, Panels B, C and D illustrate that when the size of type L investors β increases,
the equilibrium Sharpe ratio θ and risk-free interest rate r decrease, but the price-
dividend ratio V goes up or the return of stock goes down. Due to the volatility
of the stock being a constant, σD, the Sharpe ratio is a good proxy for the equity
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premium (or the excess return). As we know that the return of the stock equals
the equity premium plus the risk-free interest rate, Figure 2.7, Panels B, C and D
tell us that the decrease of the stock return is caused by the decrease in both the
equity premium and the risk-free interest rate. Actually, the prices of the assets are
determined by buyers. We name this effect as “buyer pressure”. On the one hand,
with the larger size of type L investors, the type L investors demand more stocks.
However, since the risky stock is in a fixed supply, it pushes the stock price V up
and meanwhile the return of the stock goes down. On the other hand, the type H
investors want to buy more bonds in order to protect themselves so that the price
of the bond goes up. That makes the risk-free interest rate r decrease. This “buyer
pressure”provides a buying power to determine the prices of both risk-free and risk
assets.
In the homogeneous case, the optimal consumption shares of type L investors
and holdings of the stock are the same and equal to β. In addition, holdings of the
risk-free asset are kept at zero (the dashed lines in Figure 2.9). However, when het-
erogeneity exists, the relationship between holdings of the stock and the size of the
institution β is nonlinear. The largest difference is that the plot of type L investors
shorting the risk-free asset (borrowing money) is bell-shaped (Figure 2.9, Panel F).
With an increase in the size of type L investors, the type L investors are able to
borrow more money to invest in the risky asset. At a certain point, as the type L
investors become larger, the size of the type H investors shrinks, and therefore the
borrowing of type L investors is reduced in the economy. This is a very important
illustration of how leverage in the economy depends on the size of the type L in-
vestors. Actually, the plot of type L investors longing the additional risk asset is
bell-shaped as well (Figure 2.9, Panel D). The changes of the stock investment φL
times the stock price should equal the total borrowed money, which has the same
shape as Figure 2.9, Panel E.
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Figure 2.9: Effects of the size of type L investors β.
Panels A, C and E, respectively, plot the consumption share, holdings of the risk-free as-
set and holdings of the risky asset of type H investors. Panels B, D and F, respectively,
plot that of type L investors. The solid (blue) line corresponds to the equilibrium with het-
erogeneous investors; the dashed (red) line corresponds to an equilibrium in the bench-
mark homogeneous economy. The plots are typical. The models parameters are as follows:
D0 = 1, µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, ε = 1/3, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02, t = 20, Dt = 1.43.
In addition, Figure 2.9, Panel B shows that with the small size of type L investors,
type L investors prefer to consume more because they can easily borrow enough
money from the type H investors to buy the stock. At the same time, because their
borrowing of type L investors is reduced in the economy, type L investors prefer to
consume less to buy the stock.
Testable hypotheses on the effects of the size of type L investors: In an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium with heterogeneous type L investors,
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(i) the weight ratio b (which is the ratio of the weight of type L investors over the
weight of type H investors in the welfare function) increases with the size of
type L investors, β, in the economy;
(ii) the Sharpe ratio θ and the risk-free interest rate r decrease with the size of type
L investors;
(iii) the price-dividend ratio V increases with the size of type L investors β;
(iv) the consumption share of type L investors sL increases with β;
(v) the stock investment of type L investors φ̂L increases with the size of type L
investors; and
(vi) for β ∈ (0, 1), the type L investor is always levered, ψL < 0.
Effects of risk-averse heterogeneity ε.
In Figure 2.11, the weight ratio b falls with increasing type L investors’ risk aver-
sion (Figure 2.11, Panel A), but there is no effect of the risk-averse heterogeneity
on the weight ratio b when the size of the type L investors is zero (β = 0) or one
(β = 1). The effects on the Sharpe ratio, the risk-free interest rate and the price-
dividend ratio depend on the size of type L investors. In particular, compared with
the price-dividend ratio, the Sharpe ratio and the risk-free interest rate have a neg-
ative response to the risk-averse heterogeneity for the large size of type L investors
(e.g., β = 0.75). Those effects are the same as the effects of the size of type L in-
vestors β. When the risk-averse heterogeneity ε increases, the type L investors have
low risk aversion, while the type H investors have more. That encourages the type
L investors to buy the more risky asset and the type H investors to buy more risk-
free asset, so that the prices of risky and risk-free assets increase. In other words, the
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“buyer pressure”leads to the return of the stock price and the risk-free interest rate
goes down.
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Figure 2.11: Effects of risk-averse heterogeneity ε.
Panel A plots the ratio of the weight of type L investors in the welfare function over the
weight of type H investors in the welfare function b against the size of type L investors β.
Panel B plots the equilibrium Sharpe ratio θ against the faction of type L investors in the
economy. Panels C and D plot the equilibrium asset prices: risk-free interest rate r and the
price-dividend ratio V , respectively. The plots are typical. The models parameters are as
follows: D0 = 1, µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02, t = 20.
In Figure 2.13, Panel D, the risky asset investment of the type L investors goes
slightly up with the risk-averse heterogeneity. If we the changes of the stock in-
vestment φL times the stock price, its shape should be same to Figure 2.13, Panel E.
Figure 2.13, Panel F reveals that except for the homogeneous case (β = 0, 1), higher
risk-averse heterogeneity forces the type L investors to borrow more money (i.e.,
higher leverage). Finally, in Figure 2.13, Panel B, relatively more risk-seeking type
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L investors have less consumption to save more money to buy the risky asset in the
presence of type L investors.
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Figure 2.13: Effects of risk-averse heterogeneity ε.
Panels A, C and E, respectively, plot the consumption share, holdings of the risk-free asset
and holdings of the risky asset of type H investors. Panels B, D and F, respectively, plot that
of type L investors. The plots are typical. The models parameters are as follows: D0 = 1, µ =
0.018, σD = 0.036, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02, t = 20, Dt = 1.43.
Testable hypotheses on effects of the risk-averse heterogeneity: In an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium with the presence of type L investors,
(i) the Sharpe ratio θ and the risk-free interest rate r decrease for type L investors
with a large size (e.g., β = 0.75) but increase for those with a small size (e.g.,
β = 0.25) with the increase of the risk-averse heterogeneity ε;
(ii) the price-dividend ratio V increases for type L investors with a large size but
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decreases for those with a small size with the increase of the risk-averse het-
erogeneity ε;
(iii) the weight ratio b and type L investors’ consumption share sL slightly go
down, while the stock investment of the type L investors φ̂L slightly goes up
with the increase of the risk-averse heterogeneity ε;
(iv) for β ∈ (0, 1), the type L investors are always levered, and the leverage rises
with the ε in the economy.
Based on the above analysis, our perturbation solutions for the equilibrium model
in a pure exchange economy can perfectly explain the effects of the size of type L in-
vestors and the risk-averse heterogeneity on the Sharpe ratio, the risk-free interest
rate, the stock price and optimal trading strategies for institutional and type H in-
vestors. To summarize, following the standard framework in Wang (1996), this chap-
ter reveals the mechanism of how the size of type L investors (the initial wealth) and
risk-averse heterogeneity affect the weight ratio and the equilibrium.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study a pure exchange economy in which there are two types of
investors, with lower and higher risk aversion, each with CRRA utility. This chapter
presents theoretical analysis and a complete solution to the equilibrium problem in
an exchange economy with these two heterogeneous investors.
This chapter completely solves for the equilibrium in this economy and to iden-
tify the optimal consumption-sharing rule, pricing function, Sharpe ratio, risk-free
rate, stock price and optimal trading strategies for each type of investor. Our solu-
tions are written as functions of the size of type L investors in a perturbation form,
with risk-aversion heterogeneity as a small parameter. Numerical experiments show
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that our solution is accurate. It is very convenient to use our solutions, as they are in
a closed-form.
Taking advantage of the tractability of our solutions, we analyse the effects of
the size of type L investors and the risk-aversion heterogeneity on the equilibrium.
We fully discuss the effect of the size of type L investors and the effect of the risk-
aversion heterogeneity. These effects help us to better understand the economics of
financial markets.
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 The solution for the maximization problem (2.9) using Bhamra and
Uppal’s (2014) method
Here, we use Bhamra and Uppal’s (2014) method to solve the maximization problem





































t , η =
γH
γL
and sH,t + sL,t = 1. In our chapter,
we assume γL < γH .
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where R = (η−1)
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ηη ; for z ∈ C and k ∈ N,
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k
 = Πkj=1 z−k+jj is the generalized
binomial coefficient and for z, k ∈ R+,
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 , Dt < b 1γL−γH γH−γLγL (γHγL ) γHγL−γH ,





























 , Dt < b 1γL−γH γH−γLγL (γHγL ) γHγL−γH .
2.5.2 Proofs for Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2.3.1:
According to perturbation methods (e.g., Nayfeh (2008)), we denote f(Dt; ε) := ĉH,t.
For a small ε, f(Dt; ε) can be approximated in second-order by
f(Dt; ε) = f0,t + f1,tε+ f2,tε
2 +O(ε3). (2.34)




Dt − f0,t − f1,tε− f2,tε2
)






2 [(Dt − f0,t) f0,t] +
−f1,tf0,t + (Dt − f0,t)f1,t
Dt − f0,t
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We can collect powers of
O(ε0) : Dt − f0,t = b1/γf0,t,
O(ε1) : − f1,t = b1/γ (f0,t ln [(Dt − f0,t) f0,t] + f1,t) ,





2 [(Dt − f0,t) f0,t]
+
−f1,tf0,t + (Dt − f0,t)f1,t
Dt − f0,t
+ f1,t ln [(Dt − f0,t) f0,t] + f2,t
]
.












a(1− a)(h2t + 2ht)
2(a+ 1)3
Dt,





+ 2 lnDt, a = b1/γ .
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.2:
Following the definition of the marginal utility of the representative investor in
























































(a− 1) ln Dt
a+ 1
+ a ln a
)]
+O(ε2).








D−γt (1 + εgt) +O(ε2).
where gt = g1 lnDt + g0, g1 =
γ(a−1)
a+1 and g0 =
γ
a+1 (a ln a− (a− 1) ln(a+ 1)). Then,





δ + µγ − 1
2




σ2D(2γ + 1)− µ
)]
dt
− (γ − εg1)σDdBt,
and the first-order perturbation solution for the Sharpe ratio is
θt = (γ − εg1)σD +O(ε2).
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Since Ds = Dte(µ−
1
2
σ2D)(s−t)+σD(Bs−Bt), then lnDs = lnDt + (µ − 12σ
2
D)(s − t) +
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Therefore, the portfolios of type L investors are
φ̂L,t = 1− φ̂H,t, ψ̂L,t = −ψ̂H,t.
Using initial wealth of type H investors, WA,0 = (1 − β)S0, the weight ratio b is
restricted by


























2.5.3 An extension to the second-order solutions
In this appendix, we shall present the second-order solutions to study the effects of
the cash flow news Dt on the equilibrium. In addition, in this case, the volatility
of the risk-free interest rate is no longer zero and the volatility of the stock market
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return is no longer same to the dividend’s volatility, so that we will investigate how
the size of type L investors and the risk-averse heterogeneity affect the volatility of
assets. Taking on the same steps of the proof of the first-order solutions, we give the
solution for the equilibrium in the second-order in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5.1 (Equilibrium in second-order) 19 When the economy is in equilib-
rium, the equilibrium risk-free interest rate is
rt =δ + µγ −
1
2



































[2γa(a− 1) ln(a)− 2γ(a− 1)2 ln(a+ 1) + 4a ln(a)
− 8a ln(a+ 1) + 8a],













19The proof is available upon request.
20Similarly to Bhamra and Uppal (2009), the non-zero volatility of the risk-free interest rate or the
stochastic risk-free interest rate is due to the more volatile consumptions in (2.16)-(2.17) in the second-
order. In addition, it leads to that the volatility of the stock price is no longer σD .
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lnDt + k1 − g0g1
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σD +O(ε3). (2.36)





























































and the volatility of stock market return (dSt/St) is
σS = σD +
4ε2γ
(
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Therefore, the bond investment of type H investors and the portfolio of type L investors are
ψ̂H,t = WH,t − φ̂H,tSt, φ̂L,t = 1− φ̂H,t, ψ̂L,t = −ψ̂H,t,
and the weight ratio b = aγ is restricted by
1− β = φ̂H,0. (2.37)
21Similar to Wang (1996), the wealth process can be expressed by the stock price and the divided.
As there is only one state variable Dt, the wealth process WH,t is one of our solutions.
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ε− 2γa (2 + ht)
(a+ 1)2
ε2 +O(ε3)
=(1− β)γH + βγL +O(ε3). (2.38)
In Proposition 2.5.1, the risk-free interest rate is stochastic. If µ− 12σ
2
D(2γ+1) > 0
is fixed, then rt decreases with cash flow news Dt in the economy (e.g., see Figure
2.15, Panel A), and vice versa. In addition, the Sharpe ratio and the excess market
return (the equity premium) are always decreasing with cash flow news Dt (e.g., see
Figure 2.15, Panel B and C), while the price-dividend ratio St/Dt is always increasing
with cash flow news Dt (e.g., see Figure 2.15, Panel D). Actually, the volatility of the
stock is constant so that the excess return behaves analogously to the Sharpe ratio.
Because the type L investors are overweighted in the risky stock relative to the retail
investors, good cash flow news always produces a wealth transfer from the type H
investors to the type L investors. So, the the Sharpe ratio is therefore decreasing in
Dt. In terms of price-dividend ratio, intuitively, if a good cash flow news is coming,
the stock price will always increase.
22By using the restricted equation of the weight ratio b in (2.37), we can get the second equality in
(2.38). As γH = γ(1 + ε) and γH − γ(1− ε), only constant and the first order terms of φ̂H,0 contribute
to the finally results.
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Figure 2.15: Effects of cash flow news Dt.
Panel A, B, C and D respectively plot the risk-free interest rate, Sharpe ratio, the excess return
of the stock and the price-dividend ratio against the cash flow newsDt. The plots are typical.
The models parameters are as follows: µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, b = 1.7, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02.
In addition, Figure 2.17 Panel B illustrates the response of the type L investors’
equilibrium stock investment to cash flow news. In equilibrium, both types of in-
vestors have positive holdings of the risky stock (see Figure 2.9 and 2.13) so that
good cash flow news derives each investors to buy more risky stocks. As we set
b = 1.7 (or β = 0.67), the type L investors dominates the market. Thus, as positive
cash flow news arrives (Dt increases), the type L investors buy more risky asset from
the type H investors.
When an negative shock occurs (moving from the middle to the left hand side
in Figure 2.17, Panel D ), type L investors will sell their risky asset and buy more
bonds to reduce their lost, and consequently become less important, so that type
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L investors may increase their risk aversion. Further, because type L investors are
overweighted in the risky stock, the risk takers is hurt relatively more when an neg-
ative shock occurs.
For a good economy, type L investors earn more. With good new coming, the
price of the stock increases (moving from the middle to the right hand side in Figure
2.17, Panel D). As type L investors own more risky stock, they buy more risky stocks
so that they become wealthier and wealthier (Figure 2.17, Panel F). In contrast, retails
investors loss more and more. Finally, they have to borrow money from type L
investors (Figure 2.17, Panel C).23
23Even though we set β < 0.5 (e.g., β = 0.2 or b = 0.35) which means the initial size type L
investors is quite small , the evolutions of Figure 2.17 are not changed. It tells us that with the economy
developing better and better, the type L investors become wealthier and wealthier. This is consistent
to the fact that the size of type L investors jumps sharply from 7-8% in 1950 to 67% in 2010. Our
model does explain the phenomenon that type L investors as risk takers become larger and larger in
the financial market.
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Figure 2.17: Effects of cash flow news Dt.
Panel A, C and E plot the stock and bond investment and the wealth of type H investors,
respectively. Panel B, D and F plot the stock and bond investment and the wealth of type
L investors, respectively. The plots are typical. The models parameters are as follows: µ =
0.018, σD = 0.036, b = 1.7, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02.
Testable hypotheses on the effects of cash flow news: In an Arrow-Debreu equi-
librium with heterogeneous type L investors,
(i) the Sharpe ratio θ, the risk-free interest rate r and the stock excess return de-
crease with the cash flow news;
(ii) the price-dividend ratio V increases with the cash flow news Dt;
(iii) the stock investment and the wealth of type L investors φ̂L increase with the
cash flow news.
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In benchmark case, the volatilities of the risk-free interest rate and stock market
return are not related to the size of type L investors, while, in heterogeneous case,
the plots of the asset volatility are bell-shaped (see Figure 2.19). Based on the above
discussion of Figure 2.9, the bell-shaped diagram is because of effect of leverage on
bond and stock markets. The wealth transfers between type L investors and retails
investors increase the fluctuation of assets. Because the type H investors (who have
higher risk aversion) are more sensitive to shocks, the effect of the two agents on
bond and stock market volatility is not symmetric.
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Figure 2.19: Effects of the size of type L investors β.
Panels A and B, respectively, plot the relative volatilities of the risk-free interest rate and the
risky asst against the faction of type L investors in the economy. The plots are typical. The
models parameters are as follows: D0 = 1, µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02.
Figure 2.21 reveals that with increasing of risk-averse heterogeneity, the volatility
of the risk-free and risky assets goes up against different size of type L investors.
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It shows that risk-averse heterogeneity is one of sources of risk. This response is
corresponding to Bhamra and Uppal (2009, 2014).
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Figure 2.21: Effects of risk-averse heterogeneity ε.
Panels A and B, respectively, plot the relative volatilities of the risk-free interest rate and the
risky asst against the risk-averse heterogeneity. The plots are typical. The models parameters
are as follows: D0 = 1, µ = 0.018, σD = 0.036, γ = 3/4, δ = 0.02.
Testable hypotheses on the volatility of assets: In an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
with heterogeneous type L investors,
(i) the volatility of the risk-free interest rate and the volatility of the stock are
higher in the presence of type L investors;
(ii) the volatility of the risk-free interest rate and the volatility of the stock increase
with the increase of the risk-averse heterogeneity ε.
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By virtue of the second-order solutions, we further understand the underlying
economic mechanism on how the cash flow news Dt influences the equilibrium,
e.g., the risk-free interest rate, price-dividend ratio, wealth process of investors and
investors’ investments in both bond and stock markets. Furthermore, the stochastic
risk-free interest rate and the stochastic stock produce their volatilities affected by
both the size of type L investors and risk-averse heterogeneity.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium Equity and Variance
Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
This chapter is joint work with Jin E. Zhang. Its earlier version was presented at 2016
Auckland Finance Meeting, 16-18 December 2016, AUT, Auckland, New Zealand.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we construct an equilibrium model in a cost-free production econ-
omy with a representative investor who has recursive preferences. To simplify, we
assume the process of the stock price follows a stochastic volatility with contem-
poraneous jumps (SVCJ) model.1 After solving the equilibrium, we conclude the
SVCJ model and its degenerated models built on our cost-free production economy
can perfectly capture the high equity risk premium (ERP). In addition, for some ex-
tremely large ERP periods in which the annualized ERP is at or larger than 11%
(e.g., 1990–1999 and 2010–2016), the SVCJ model and the stochastic volatility with
1The SVCJ is one of the most widely-used affine jump-diffusion (AJD) models (see Duffie, Pan,
and Singleton (2000)).
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
56
jumps in volatility (SVJV) model built on our cost-free production economy can suc-
cessfully explain the large ERP and the large negative VRP. To our knowledge, our
model is the first production-based equilibrium model to explain the equity pre-
mium puzzle and the large negative VRP.
An explanation of the high negative VRP, defined as the realized variance (RV)
minus the implied variance (IV), is a very important topic.2 Practically, the VRP
is the practitioners’ cost to get protection against high realized variance via buying
variance swaps. How much they need to pay, of course, is a very crucial issue for
practitioners’ care.3 Empirically, Carr and Wu (2009) use the difference between the
RV and this synthetic variance swap rate to quantify the VRP and find that there
exists a large and negative mean of the VRP on five stock indexes and 35 individual
stocks by using a large options data set. Todorov (2010); Bollerslev and Todorov
(2011); Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2015) use the rare events to account for the
large average VRP. Recently, González-Urteaga and Rubio (2016) discuss and test the
volatility risk premium at the individual and portfolio level.4 Barras and Malkhozov
(2016) formally compare the market VRP inferred from equity and option markets
and find that the average difference between the two VRPs is essentially zero. Aı̈t-
Sahalia, Karaman, and Mancini (2015); Li and Zinna (2017) examine the term struc-
tures of the VRP by using variance swap rates data. Dew-Becker, Giglio, Le, and
Rodriguez (2017) use novel data on a wide range of variance swaps with maturities
between one month and 10 years in the period 1996–2014 to analyse the pricing of
variance swaps, and they find that news about future volatility is unpriced, while ex-
posure to realized variance is strongly priced. These results present a challenge to all
2The large negative VRP means the large average negative VRP. Our definition follows Carr and
Wu (2009). Some papers propose the positive VRP as they define the VRP as the implied variance
minus the realized variance.
3Mixon and Onur (2015) report that the gross vega notional outstanding for variance swaps, in
2014, is over USD 2 billion, with USD 1.5 billion in S&P 500 products. The volatility market has become
particularly popular over last decade.
4The difference between the variance risk premium and the volatility risk premium is whether we
take a square root of the variance.
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existing asset pricing models, such as the intertemporal capital asset pricing model
(ICAPM) and recent models with Epstein–Zin preferences and long-run risks. The-
oretically, Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Bollerslev, Sizova, and
Tauchen (2012); Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015) adopt the long-run risks model (first pro-
posed by Bansal and Yaron (2004)) to successfully explain the large average VRP. In
addition, Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2014) use a two-tree Lucas (1978) economy
with two heterogeneous investors to explain well the volatility risk premium. All
previous models in the literature are built on a consumption economy. In this chap-
ter, we construct a simple production-based equilibrium model and successfully ex-
plain the large ERP and VRP with a much lower level of relative risk aversion (RRA)
of 1.008, when the annualized ERP is at or larger than 11% (e.g., the periods, 1990–
1999 and 2010–2016). However, the existing literature, Drechsler and Yaron (2011)
choose a value of 9.5 to explain the VRP and Drechsler (2013) sets it as 5.
The production-based equilibrium model adopted in this chapter is developed
from the neoclassical growth model in Constantinides (1990), which is first studied
by Cox et al. (1985a) and followed by Bates (1991, 1996); Vasicek (2005); Zhang et al.
(2012); Fu and Yang (2012); Ruan, Zhu, Huang, and Zhang (2016).5 The main differ-
ence between our production-based equilibrium model and the classic consumption-
based equilibrium model (e.g., Lucas (1978); Mehra and Prescott (1985); Bansal and
Yaron (2004); Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Wachter (2013)) is that we construct our
model starting from the index level (e.g., S&P 500), while the consumption-based
model is based on the fundamentals (i.e., consumption and dividends). This differ-
ence does affect a lot. For example, in terms of the equity premium puzzle, based
on a consumption-based equilibrium model, Mehra and Prescott (1985) find that the
equity premium (6.18%) is the product of the coefficient of the RRA and the variance
5The cost-free production economy is taken from Constantinides (1990). However, Constantinides
(1990) only solves an investment problem instead of an equilibrium problem. Thus, we adopt the equi-
librium conditions in Cox et al. (1985a) and others to extend the investment model in Constantinides
(1990) into a cost-free production-based equilibrium model.
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
58
of the growth rate of consumption (3.57%2), which leads to the very large coeffi-
cient of RRA, 48.7, based on a sample of the U.S. economy from 1889 to 1978. On
the other hand, with the same sample, the production-based model (see the second
term in Equation (3.1) in Zhang et al. (2012)) implies a very small coefficient of the
RRA, only 2.2. This is because the ERP in Zhang et al. (2012) is the product of the co-
efficient of the RRA and the variance of the real return on the S&P 500 (16.54%2). As
the production-based equilibrium model works so well in explaining in the equity
premium puzzle, in this chapter we use it to explain the VRP.
One reason we call our model the cost-free production-based equilibrium model
is that it can be regarded as a special case of the AK production model, which is de-
veloped from the neoclassical investment model ( see Hayashi (1982)) and recently
well extended by Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011); DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang
(2012); Wang, Wang, and Yang (2012); Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013); Pindyck and
Wang (2013) and others, in which there is no cost of installing capital (i.e., new in-
vestments) and the firm’s productivity (i.e., “A”) and the Tobin’ q equals one, so that
the value of the capital stock (i.e., stock price) is the same as the capital stock (i.e.,
“K”). For example, if we assume the cost of installing capital is zero in Pindyck and
Wang (2013), we will get the one-valued Tobin’ q and solve that the stock price is
the capital stock. In order to emphasize the importance of our model, we name this
specialized model the cost-free production-based equilibrium model.
Should the diffusive volatility risk premium (DVRP), which is defined as the
mean-reverting speed of the volatility in the risk-neutral measure minus that in the
physical probability measure,6 be theoretically positive or negative? As a detailed
overview provided in Broadie et al. (2007), conflicting estimates of the DVRP have
existed for a long time in the literature. For example, using the simple stochastic
6The similar concept is used by Heston (1993); Bates (2000); Pan (2002); Eraker (2004); Neumann,
Prokopczuk, and Wese Simen (2016).
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volatility model (SV), Jones (2003) estimate a positive DVRP, while Pan (2002); Er-
aker et al. (2003) observe a negative DVRP. Thus, regarding the sign of the DVRP,
Broadie et al. (2007) argue that there is no theory providing guidance. Actually,
there are a few studies on that. Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b); Bates (1991, 1996,
2000) show that the DVRP is negative as the volatility is negatively correlated to
the S&P 500 index. Recently, Eraker and Wu (2017) have proposed a consumption-
based equilibrium model and document that the DVRP is negative for any positive
risk aversion coefficients. In order to qualify Broadie et al.’s (2007) argument, we
use an equilibrium model to provide guidance on the sign of the DVRP based on the
SVCJ model. Consistent with Cox et al. (1985b); Bates (1991, 1996, 2000); Eraker and
Wu (2017), our production-based model documents again that the sign of the DVRP
should be negative.
Finally, our model constructed in this chapter involves the recursive preferences,
which are well studied by Weil (1989); Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991). Later on, Duffie
and Epstein (1992b,a) develop it into the continuous-time version. Now the recur-
sive preferences are popularly used in asset pricing models (e.g., Bansal and Yaron
(2004); Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2011); Wachter (2013)). The main
advantage of the recursive preferences is separating the RRA and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS). In spite of increasing its complexity, we provide
analytical expressions for all solutions, which are linked to the impact of the RRA
and the EIS. Similar to the DVRP, conflicting estimates of the EIS exist in the litera-
ture. For example, Bansal and Yaron (2004) estimate EIS of 1.5 and Bansal, Gallant,
and Tauchen (2007) estimate the EIS of 2, while Hall (1988); Epstein and Zin (1991)
and others estimate that EIS is below 1. In this chapter, we provide an alternative
parameter setting, 0 < EIS < 1 and 1 < RRA < 2, to explain the ERP and VRP
based on our cost-free production-based equilibrium model. As we mentioned be-
fore, Dew-Becker et al. (2017) raise the challenge that Epstein–Zin preferences for
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early resolution of uncertainty (e.g., RRA > 1/EIS) can not explain their empiri-
cal observations, i.e., news about future volatility is unpriced. In our chapter, we
get a calibration with Epstein–Zin preferences for late resolution of uncertainty (e.g.,
RRA < 1/EIS).7 This may explain the empirical observations in Dew-Becker et al.
(2017).
This chapter makes at least two contributions: (i) We develop a cost-free production-
based equilibrium model as the first production-based equilibrium model to explain
the equity premium puzzle and the large negative VRP. (ii) We provide guidance on
the sign of the DVRP based on the SVCJ model.
The remainder of our chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
definition of the ERP and VRP. Section 3.3 presents and solves the equilibrium model.
Section 3.4 provides the empirical analysis. Section 3.5 concludes. Appendix 3.6.1
collects all proofs. Appendix 3.6.2 gives a comparison of estimates and Appendix
3.6.3 presents an example.
3.2 Equity and Variance Risk Premiums
3.2.1 Equity and Variance Risk Premiums
According to Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Bollerslev et al.
(2012); Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015), we purposely rely on the readily available squared
VIX index as our measure for the risk-neutral expected variance. In addition, follow-
ing Buraschi et al. (2014); González-Urteaga and Rubio (2016), we use daily returns
of the S&P 500 to calculate the realized variance over 21-day post windows. The
7In this case, the marginal utility gain is very important with regard to risk aversion; the investor
wishes to wait in order to get a potential increase in future utility. Then, he or she prefers the late
resolution of uncertainty. Similarly, we can understand that the investor is not very risk-averse so
that he or she does not want to know the realization of the randomness in the future. Overall, the
late resolution of uncertainty indicates the investor is quite risk-taking. See Kreps and Porteus (1978);
Eeckhoudt, Gollier, Treich, et al. (2005).
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daily ERP is simply defined as the daily log returns of the S&P 500 minus the three-
month Treasury bill adjusted by the U.S. inflation rate. All data are obtained from
Bloomberg.8
Definition 3.2.1 (Equity and Variance Risk Premium) We define the (annualized) ERP
as9
ERPt = (Rt − rt/252)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Daily ERP
×252, (3.1)
where Rt = (lnSt − lnSt−1) × 100 is the daily percentage returns of the S&P 500 and
rt is the real risk-free rate which is calculated from the daily three-month Treasury bill rate
adjusted by the U.S. inflation rate. In addition, we define the one-month VRP as10
V RPt = RVt − V IX2t , (3.2)
where the one-month realized variance RVt is calculated by the annualized variance of the
daily percentage returns of the S&P 500 over 21-day post windows at day t and V IX2t is the
daily squared VIX index at day t divided by 12.
8The three-month Treasury bill data are the percentage annual risk-free rate. As the three-month
Treasury bill rate is daily while the U.S. inflation rate is monthly, the daily three-month Treasury bill
rate is adjusted by the same inflation rate for each month.
9Throughout the chapter, without the added ”daily”, the ERP means annualized ERP.
10As V IX2t 6= EQ[RVt] = IVt based on Footnote 9, if there exist jumps in the return, we can rewrite
the definition V RPt = RVt − SWVt + SWVt − V IX2 where swap variance SWVt is the sum of the
difference between simple return and log return over 21-day post windows and V IX2t = EQ[SWVt].
For more details see Jiang and Yao (2013). We compute the averageRVt−SWVt is 0.01373 and 0.02228
during the period 02 January 1990 to 20 May 2016 and the subperiod 02 January 1990 to 30 September
2016, respectively, which are very small compared with the average V RP . Thus, we use V IX2 as a
good proxy of IVt here.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics.
The data are from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. We compute the daily equity
risk premium with Rt − rt/252 where Rt is the daily percentage returns of the S&P 500
and rt is the three-month Treasury bill rate adjusted by the inflation rate. The one-month
V RPt = RVt − V IX2t , where the one-month realized variance RVt calculated by the annu-
alized variance of the daily percentage returns of the S&P 500 over 21-day post windows at
day t and V IX2t is the daily squared VIX index at time t divided by 12. All mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum variables are reported in units of 1/12 of the annual
value, except that rt and the mean of ERP is given in annualized terms, and R and the
standard deviation, minimum and maximum of ERP are reported in daily.
Full sample: 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016 (N = 6742)
R r ERP RV V IX2 V RP
Mean 0.0269 0.3507 6.4299 26.7926 37.5811 -10.7884
Minimum -9.4695 -4.8700 -9.4557 1.7891 7.2230 -272.4370
Maximum 10.9572 3.8000 10.9709 590.7901 544.8616 470.7357
Std 1.1301 1.8682 1.12998 47.6415 38.5554 34.2257
Skewness -0.2441 -0.16781 -0.2391 6.9652 4.9319 6.1047
Kurtosis 11.6121 2.1003 11.6129 64.9391 41.3037 79.8023
Subsample in Broadie et al. (2007): 02 January 1990 to 31 December 1999 (N = 2528)
R r ERP RV V IX2 V RP
Mean 0.0564 1.8421 12.3619 16.7820 31.3297 -14.5477
Minimum -7.1127 -0.5900 -7.1241 1.8478 7.2230 -136.7603
Maximum 4.9887 3.8000 4.9767 155.9434 174.3456 79.2844
Std 0.8889 1.1018 0.8888 17.4664 21.9202 17.6066
Skewness -0.3416 -0.4190 -0.3462 3.8207 2.1650 -0.3131
Kurtosis 8.2442 1.9902 8.2532 23.1893 9.8630 12.8382
Subsample in Drechsler (2013): 02 January 1990 to 31 December 2009 (N = 5043)
R r ERP RV V IX2 V RP
Mean 0.0228 0.9827 4.7594 28.8674 40.1087 -11.2413
Minimum -9.4695 -4.8700 -9.4557 1.8479 7.2230 -272.4370
Maximum 10.9572 3.8000 10.9709 590.7901 544.8616 470.7357
Std 1.1727 1.6573 1.1725 53.0966 42.20491 37.3264
Skewness -0.1987 -0.5853 -0.1919 6.5163 4.7517 6.1042
Kurtosis 12.1671 2.7681 12.1720 54.9878 37.0188 74.6994
Subsample: 04 January 2010 to 30 September 2016 (N = 1699)
R r ERP RV V IX2 V RP
Mean 0.0391 -1.5252 11.3884 20.6342 30.0783 -9.4441
Minimum -6.8959 -3.900 -6.8810 1.7890 8.8752 -118.8822
Maximum 4.6317 0.2300 4.6467 195.5504 192.0000 155.0615
Std 0.9932 0.9959 0.9931 24.2595 23.1712 22.6030
Skewness -0.4415 -0.4643 -0.4369 3.6861 2.7176 2.8228
Kurtosis 7.0640 2.7999 7.0560 21.1070 12.1023 21.8281
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Table 3.1 shows that the mean of the annualized ERP is 6.4299 and the mean of
the one-month VRP in the sample period is −10.7884 per month, which is signifi-
cantly negative, over the period from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. The
mean of the one-month realized variance is 26.7926 and the mean of the one-month
V IX2 is 37.5811. We provide the summary statistics for the same sample in Drech-
sler (2013) and find that the variables generated based on our definitions are close to
Drechsler (2013). The means ofRV , V IX2 and V RP in Table 3.1 are 28.8674, 40.1087
and −11.2413 and in Drechsler (2013) are 28.82, 39.32 and −10.55. Comparing dif-
ferent sample periods, the average ERP is more volatile than the average VRP. For
example, the means of the VRP in the periods, 1990–2009 and 2010–2016 are very
close, around −10, while, the mean of the ERP in the 2010–2016 period is more than
double the mean in the 1990–2009 period.
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Figure 3.1: Dynamics of the VRP.
The data are from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. We define the one-month variance
risk premium as V RPt = RVt − V IX2t , where the one-month realized variance RVt is calcu-
lated by the annualized variance of the daily percentage returns of the S&P 500 over 21-day
post windows at day t and V IX2t is the daily squared VIX index at time t divided by 12.
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Some days have a positive V RP (e.g., maximum is 470.7357), which indicates
financial disasters. For example, in Figure 3.1, there are 41 days from August to
November in 2008 whose V RP is larger than 100. In addition, the maximum exists
on 25 September 2008. More crashes (e.g., the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 1998 Rus-
sian financial crisis, stock market downturn of 2002, August 2011 stock market fall
and 2015–16 Chinese stock market crash ) can be found in the positive-V RP periods.
This suggests that the positive VRP can be an indicator of financial crashes.11
11For example, Chen, Shu, and Zhang (2016) use the sentiment factor to explain why the variance
risk premium is positive in a financial crisis period.
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3.2.2 Model-implied Equity and Variance Risk Premiums
The affine jump-diffusion models are well studied by Duffie et al. (2000). In this
chapter, we adopt the following SVCJ model (e.g., Eraker et al. (2003); Eraker (2004);
Broadie et al. (2007)) to describe the joint dynamics of the stock price.12 More general
models are discussed in Duffie et al. (2000).






x − 1)dNt − λmdt,




where BS,t and BV,t are a pair of correlated Brownian motions with correlation co-
efficient ρ on a probability space (Ω,F ,P); Nt is a Poisson process with the intensity
λ; the jump size of the volatility has an exponential distribution y ∼ exp(1/µV )
with mean µV and the jump size of the stock price is x ∼ N(µS , σ2S); the growth







is the (instantaneous) equity risk premium (ERP) con-




scaled 100 (see Broadie et al. (2007));1314 r is risk-free rate and κ, θ and σV are con-
stant and m = eµS+
1
2
σ2S − 1.15 The SVCJ model can be degenerated into two other
12The SVCJ is the most popular AJD model used for option and other derivatives pricing (e.g.,
Eraker et al. (2003); Eraker (2004); Broadie et al. (2007); Zhu and Lian (2012); Zheng and Kwok (2014);
Neumann et al. (2016) and others). They empirically document that the SVCJ works quite well to fit
the S&P 500 index.
13In our model, we assume the exogenous µt have a special form µt = r + φt, i.e., the sum of a
constant exogenous risk-free rate r and the endogenous equity premium φt which can be solved in the
equilibrium.
14The constant ηS can be estimated; for example, see Neumann et al. (2016).
15The independence of jump sizes, x and y, is consistent with the results of previous studies. For
example, Eraker et al. (2003); Eraker (2004) report statistically insignificant correlations between the
two jump sizes. In addition, this correlation primarily affects the conditional skewness of returns, µV
and the correlation between the two jump sizes play a very similar role. Broadie et al. (2007) show that
it is difficult to estimate this parameter precisely. Following Broadie et al. (2007), we assume the two
jump sizes are independent.
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model specifications often employed in the literature, namely, the stochastic volatil-
ity model with jumps in prices (SVJP) (µV = 0) and the simple stochastic volatility
model (SV) (µV = µS = σS = λ = 0).16
We specify the transition between the risk-neutral measure Q and the physical
probability measure P by using the similar transformations to those applied in Er-





















where BQS,t and B
Q
V,t are a pair of correlated Brownian motions with correlation co-
efficient ρ on a probability space (Ω,F ,Q) ; Poisson process Nt in the Q measure








σ2S − 1.18 In addition, ρ, κθ, σV , σS are the same across both measures
(the detailed transformations are shown in Section 3.3). Hence, the variance risk
premium can be defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.2 (Model-implied Equity and Variance Risk Premiums) Having esti-























16Our SVJP model is same to SVJ model in Eraker et al. (2003); Broadie et al. (2007); Yun (2011);
Neumann et al. (2016).
17In Broadie et al. (2007), authors assume λ = λQ. We set λ 6= λQ which corresponds to the equi-
librium models in Bates (2000); Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005); Zhang et al. (2012); Ruan et al. (2016). In
Section 3.3, we will confirm our setting.
18Following Broadie et al. (2007), a correlation between jumps in prices and volatility would be
difficult to identify under Q because µQV plays the same role in the conditional distribution of returns.
In order to clearly define the volatility jump risk premium, it is necessary to assume that the correlation
between jumps should be zero.
19Based on Definition 3.2.2, for daily frequency data, the ERP is instantaneous. Thus, Equation (3.5)
can model the daily frequency ERP.
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where ηS is a constant and can be determined by the equilibrium, and define the VRP as,




























































































As we are interested in the one-month (21 business days) horizon variance risk premium, we
set τ = 21 days.
Based on the above definition, the model-implied equity risk premium can be
decomposed into two components: the ERP contributed by the diffusion in the price































. As ex = 1 + x + 1
2
x2 + O(x3),
we have V IX2 = IVt + O(x3). So, in both theoretically and empirically, we find that the difference
between IVt and V IX2 is very small and that then V IX2 can be regarded as a good proxy of the IVt.
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
68
Similarly, the model-implied variance risk premium can be decomposed into three
components: the VRP contributed by the diffusion in volatility (V RP V D), the VRP
mainly contributed by the volatility jump (V RP V J ) and the VRP contributed by the
price jump (V RPPJ ).
V RPt = V RP
V D
t + V RP
V J








































From the expression (3.12), the V RP V D is mainly from the contribution of the DVRP
(i.e., κQ − κ). The jump intensity risk premium, λ− λQ, influences both V RP V J and
V RPPJ in (3.13)-(3.14). In Broadie et al. (2007), authors conclude that the DVRP is
insignificant in all SV, SVJP and SVCJ models because of the flat implied volatility
term structure. In addition, they argue that even for the more efficient estimation
procedure, they still can not confront the fact that the term structure is flat, which
still implies that the DVRP is insignificant. In Section 3.3, we give an economic
explanation that the DVRP is large and negative in reality, which suggests that re-
searchers need to choose more efficient data (e.g., Zhu and Lian (2012)), in order to
get a significant and negative DVRP.
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3.3 A Cost-free Production-based Equilibrium Model
3.3.1 Model Setup
Our cost-free production economy follows Constantinides (1990).21 There exists only
one production good, which is also consumption, and two production technologies.
There is no cost for investments, so that we can call the two production technologies
cost-free technologies and the economy the cost-free production economy. The risky




x − 1)dNt − λmdt,
where
dVt = κ(θ − Vt)dt+ σV
√
VtdBV,t + ydNt.
The riskless technology has constant returns rdt.
We suppose that there is a representative investor whose portfolio is (ut, 1− ut),
which represents the fraction of wealth invested in the risky and riskless technology,
respectively. The consumption rate of the investor is ct. Then, the investor’s capital












21Similar assumptions for the representative-consumer production economy can be found in Cox
et al. (1985a); Bates (1991, 1996); Vasicek (2005); Zhang et al. (2012); Fu and Yang (2012); Ruan et al.
(2016).
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In addition, the representative consumer has recursive preferences (see Duffie and





















−1 − ((1− γ)J)ω
((1− γ)J)ω−1
, (3.17)
where the subjective time discount factor is denoted by β; ψ is the EIS and γ is the
coefficient of RRA. In addition, ω = (1 − ψ−1)/(1 − γ). Recursive utility allows
us to separate the effects of RRA and EIS. The special case of power utility results
by setting the EIS equal to the inverse of the RRA coefficient. In this case, only
innovations to consumption are priced. In the general case γ 6= 1/ψ, state variables
carry a risk premium, too. We assume throughout that β > 0 and γ > 0. Most of the
discussion focuses on the case γ > 1.
By choosing the investment ut in the stock and the consumption rate ct, the rep-
resentative investor maximizes his/her expected objective function (3.16). Based on
Cox et al. (1985a); Bates (1991, 1996); Vasicek (2005); Zhang et al. (2012); Fu and Yang
(2012); Ruan et al. (2016), we define the market equilibrium in a production economy
as follows.
Definition 3.3.1 (Market equilibrium) Equilibrium in our cost-free production economy
is defined in a standard way: equilibrium consumption-portfolio pairs (ut, ct) are such that
the representative investor maximizes his/her expected objective function in (3.16), and mar-
kets are clear, ut = 1.




After solving the equilibrium in Definition 3.3.1, we get the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3.1 The value function is



























− (1− γ)λE [eay−γx(ex − 1)] ,







with the effective long-term mean of the variance V = κθ+λµVκ .
The equity risk premium is solved as
ERPt
100
= (γ − σV ρa)Vt + λE
[
(1− e−γx+ay)(ex − 1)
]
= (γ − σV ρa)Vt + λm− λQmQ.
(3.21)

















22Note here we choose 0 < a < 1/µV and γ > 1. Obviously, a = 0 when γ = 1.
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The explicit transition between the risk-neutral measure Q and the physical probability mea-
sure P is given by

















Following Constantinides (1990), if a firm has capital Kt at time t and it can
be freely invested in two production technologies, we assume the firm invests δ1Kt
capital in the risky technology and (1−δ1)Kt in the riskless one, where δ1 is constant.
In addition, the firm is financed with the equity (stock) St and risk-free bond Mt,
where dMt/Mt = rdt. We assume the leverage δ2 = St/(St+Mt), which is a constant.
Then, we have equality between the investment in two production technologies and
the value of the firm. dSt +Mtrdt = δ1Kt(µtdt+
√
VtdBS,t + (e
x − 1)dNt − λmdt) + (1− δ1)Ktrdt,



















In order to be consistent with our stock price process in Equation (3.3), following
Constantinides (1990), we set δ1δ2 = 1. Thus, the process of the stock price (with
dividends included) in (3.25) is the same as (3.3).
Remark 3.3.1 Our production-based model can be regarded as an extension of the
model in Cox et al. (1985a); Bates (1991, 1996, 2000); Vasicek (2005, 2013); Zhang et al.
(2012); Fu and Yang (2012); Ruan et al. (2016), which only consider that the represen-
tative consumer has a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. The
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production-based equilibrium model studied in previous literature is widely used
in derivative pricing, especially in option pricing. It is reasonable to employ the
production-based model to explain the VRP because the VIX index can be regarded
as the variance swap rates.
Remark 3.3.2 In Broadie et al. (2007), the authors suggest that ERPt100 = ηSVt +(
mλ−mQλQ
)
which is contributed by the diffusive risk premium ηSVt and the




. The solution of the ERP in (3.21) sup-
ports their assumption. In addition, ηS can be solved as γ − σV ρa, which is con-
stant, and λm − λQmQ = λE [(1− e−γx+ay)(ex − 1)], which can be verified by us-
ing the transition in (3.23). If the volatility is a constant, σ, the ERP will become
ERP
100 = γσ
2 + λE [(1− e−γx)(ex − 1)], which has been studied in Zhang et al. (2012).
Remark 3.3.3 In the equilibrium model, we find a stochastic density factor (i.e.,
state-price density) in (3.22), which provides a transition for parameters between
the risk-neutral measure Q and the physical probability measure P. The stochas-
tic density factor in (3.22) captures all risks, which are two Brownian motion risks
(BS,t and BV,t) and one jump risk (Nt). In the transition (3.23), it shows that the
jump intensity in two measures is not equal, i.e., λ 6= λQ, which is consistent with
Bates (1991, 1996, 2000); Liu et al. (2005); Zhang et al. (2012); Ruan et al. (2016). This
suggests that we have to estimate λQ as an independent risk-neutral parameter. In
addition, as µS < 0, γ > 1 and 0 < a < 1/µV , we have λ < λQ. In other words, the
jump intensity should be larger in the risk-neutral probability measure than in the
physical probability measure.
Remark 3.3.4 The transition in (3.23) documents that κQ − κ = (ργ − aσV )σV < 0
for ρ < 0, γ > 1, 0 < a < 1/µV and σV > 0. In other words, the equilibrium
model can generate the negative DVRP. It is not surprising. Actually, in the same
production-based framework, Cox et al. (1985b); Bates (1991, 1996, 2000) argue that
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DVRP is negative because of the negative correlation between the volatility and the
S&P 500 index. Recently, Eraker and Wu (2017) have proposed a consumption-based
equilibrium model and get the similar result that κQ−κ < 0 for any γ > 0. The DVRP
is also negative for the case ρ = 0 (if we assume γ > 1). Its negative sign can thus
not be attributed to the sign of ρ and thus to the “stock risk part” of variance risk.
Remark 3.3.5 For any a > 0 and γ > 0, we have µQS < µS < 0 and µ
Q
V > µV > 0.
This corresponds to the empirical results, e.g., Eraker (2004); Broadie et al. (2007);
Neumann et al. (2016). It means that the jumps in the price and the volatility are
larger in the risk-neutral probability measure than in the physical probability mea-
sure.
Remark 3.3.6 In a special case with γ = 1, we can solve a = 0 and
κQ = κ+ ρσV , µ
Q









The risk-neutral parameters are not affected by the EIS.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Model-implied ERP and VRP
Plugging the explicit transition between the risk-neutral measure Q and the physical
probability measure P given in (3.23) into Definition 3.2.2 gives us the model-implied
VRP based on our cost-free production-based equilibrium model.
Definition 3.3.2 (Equilibrium model-implied Equity and Variance Risk Premiums)
Having estimated the P parameters and the recursive preferences parameters of the represen-
tative investor, based on SVCJ model, we define the equilibrium model-implied ERP as
ERPt =
[
(γ − σV ρa)Vt + λE
(
(1− e−γx+ay)(ex − 1)
)]
× 100, (3.27)
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and the equilibrium model-implied VRP is defined as



























κ+ (ργ − aσV )σV
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Equation (3.28) shows that V RP is a function of the physical measure parame-
ters (κ, θ, σV , ρ, λ, µS , σS and µV ) and the preferences parameters (β, γ and ψ).23 In
addition, the average ERP, the average VRP, the risk-free rate r, all physical parame-
ters κ, θ, σV , ρ, λ, µS , σS , µV , and the preferences parameter β, we have an equation
system with respect to γ, ψ and a,

E[ERPt] = [(γ − σV ρa)EV + λE ((1− e−γx+ay)(ex − 1))]× 100,




















− (1− γ)λE [eay−γx(ex − 1)] ,
(3.29)
where EV = E[Vt] is the average variance which is given as well.
There is a hot debate on whether the value of the EIS should be larger or lower
23The parameter a is determined by κ, θ, σV , ρ, λ, µS , σS , µV , β, γ and ψ in Equation (3.20). Based
on Definition 3.3.2, we can further analyse the impacts of these parameters on the ERP and VRP.
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than 1. Hall (1988); Epstein and Zin (1991) and others estimate that EIS is below 1,
while in order to fit the consumption data, Bansal and Yaron (2004); Drechsler and
Yaron (2011); Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015) and others, who use a long-run risks model,
have to choose an EIS which is larger than 1. This is a critical issue. We provide an
alternative setting of EIS and RRA, in order to explain the higher ERP and VRP based
on our production-based equilibrium model.
We set the SVCJ model parameters as κ = 6.522, θ = 0.01361, σV = 0.2016, ρ =
−0.48, λ = 1.512, µS = −0.0263, σS = 0.0289, µV = 0.0373, r = 1.4821%, EV =
0.0222, β = − ln(0.999) and the targeting ERP = 12.3619 and V RP = −14.5477.24
As E[ERPt] > (γ − σV ρa)EV × 100 > γEV × 100 and EV = 2.22%, then based on
our parameter setting, we have to choose γ < 12.3619/2.22 = 5.57. Here we consider
the case γ = 1.1.25 Then, we adjust the EIS to fit the target ERP and VRP in the mean
level. The results are shown in Figure 3.2.
24All parameters are annualized estimates in Table 3.9. The mean of instantaneous volatility EV =
E[Vt] is based on 10,000 simulations, with each statistic calculated using a sample size equal to its VRP
data counterpart. The mean of the VRP is from 1990 to 1999 which is the overlapping period between
Eraker et al. (2003) and Broadie et al. (2007) after VIX launched. The risk-free rate r = 1.8421 is the
average three-month Treasury bill adjusted by the U.S. inflation rate over the same period, 1990 to
1999. For summary statistics, see Table 3.1.
25Actually, given all parameters, we are able to explicitly solve a, γ and ψ from the equation system
(3.29). However, with restrictions γ > 1, ψ > 0 and 0 < a < 1/µV , the equation system (3.29) has no
solution. We have to find some approximate solutions.
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium ERP and VRP against EIS.
We set the model parameters as κ = 6.522, θ = 0.01361, σV = 0.2016, ρ = −0.48, λ =
1.512, µS = −0.0263, σS = 0.0289, µV = 0.0373, r = 1.4821%, EV = 0.0222, β = − ln(0.999)
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Figure 3.2 shows that the parameter combination of 1 < γ < 2 and 0 < EIS < 1
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
78
(i.e., γ = 1.1 and ψ is around 0.6) is able to explain the ERP and VRP based on
our production-based model.26 This parameter choice corresponds to Epstein and
Zin (1991). In contrast to long-run risks models in Bansal and Yaron (2004); Drech-
sler and Yaron (2011); Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015), our cost-free production economy
provides an alternative way to explain the equity premium puzzle and high negative
VRP.
In addition, if we set ψ = 1/γ = 1/1.1 ≈ 0.9, then the model generatesE[ERP ] =
26.8854 and E[V RP ] = −65.6358, both of which are too large. This is the reason
why we have to use the Epstein-Zin recursive preferences. Using a small RRA, e.g.,
γ = 1.1, we adjust the EIS to fit the average ERP and VRP.
3.3.4 VRP Return Predictability
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. Combining it with Equation (3.30), we






+ αpred + εt+1, (3.31)
26In this setting, we get κQ = 5.7906, λQ = 3.9031, µQS = −0.02722 and µ
Q
V = 0.09348.









αpred = (γ − σV ρa) e−κ
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As (ργ − aσV )σV < 0, which leads to A∆ < 0, we have βpred < 0. Therefore, the
predictive coefficient is negative (with respect to the V RPt
1002
in Equation (3.6)). It cor-
responds to empirical results in Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011);
Jin (2015) and others. We report our empirical results from the daily predictive re-
gressions of monthly equity premiums on variance risk premiums in Table 3.2. We
find βpred is significantly negative with very large t-statistics (βpred = −13.52 with
−16.32). The predictive power from the volatility Vt determines the expected excess
return in Equation (3.30) and the VRP in Equation (3.28). Thus, through the informa-
tion of the volatility, the variance risk premium is able to predict the excess market
return.
Table 3.2: Return predictability.
The data are from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. This table reports empirical results
from the monthly predictive regressions of the equity premiums (S&P 500 log returns minus
the risk-free rate) on variance risk premiums (i.e., regression (3.31)). We define the monthly
ERP as (Rt− rt/12)×12 where Rt is the monthly percentage returns of the S&P 500 and rt is
the three-month Treasury bill rate. At the begining of each month, the variance risk premium
is V RPt = RVt−V IX2t where RVt calculated by the daily percentage returns of the S&P 500
over 21-day post windows at day t; V IX2t is the daily squared VIX index divided by 12 as
one-month horizon at time t. T-statistics are adjusted based on Newey-West (1987) standard
errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represents statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
βpred t-statistic adj. R2 (%)
−1.90∗∗∗ −3.39 3.06




Even though we have shown that the SVCJ model can perfectly explain the ERP and
VRP based on the parameters in Broadie et al. (2007) (see Appendix 3.6.3), in this
section, we will use longer data to robustly examine whether the SVCJ model built
in a cost-free production economy can explain the large ERP and VRP.
3.4.1 Estimates of Physical Measure Parameters
The first step is using S&P 500 returns data to estimate the physical measure param-
eters by using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampler. Eraker et al. (2003);
Eraker (2004); Amengual (2009); Zhu and Lian (2012); Kaeck and Alexander (2012)
show that (i) MCMC yields very accurate estimates for jump-diffusion models; (ii)
MCMC provides estimates of the latent volatility; (iii) MCMC outperforms the gen-
eralized method of moments (GMM), the quantile maximum likelihood estimation
(QMLE) and the efficient method of moments (EMM); (iv) MCMC can utilize pri-
ors to disentangle jumps from diffusions in an intuitive manner. Hence, we use the
MCMC approach to estimate our affine jump-diffusion models. We present a time-
discretization of Equation (3.3) by using the discrete scheme,















where α = r− 12Vt+ηSVt−λm; ε
S
t and εVt are samples from two dependent standard
normal distributions with correlation ρ; Rt = (lnSt − lnSt−1)× 100, y ∼ exp(1/µV ),
x ∼ N(µS , σ2S) and qt ∼ Ber(λ). The parameters to be estimated are α, κ, θ, σV , ρ, λ,
µS , σS , µV . Based on the analysis in Table 3.13, the jumps in the stochastic volatility
dominates the VRP. So, we are also interested in the stochastic volatility model with
jumps in volatility (SVJV) (µS = 0 and σS = 0).
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Following Eraker et al. (2003), we run the MCMC algorithm for 100,000 itera-
tions, discarding the first 10,000 as the burn-in-period to achieve the convergence of
the chain. For each parameter to be estimated, we use the same priors as in Eraker
et al. (2003) and the sample period is from 2 January 1990 to 30 September 2016 (for
summary statistics, see Table 3.1). Estimates are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: S&P 500 Parameter Estimates.
Parameter estimates for the S&P 500 index data, 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. The
estimates correspond to percentage changes in the index value. We discard the first 10,000
runs as the “burn-in”period and use the last 90,000 iterations in MCMC simulations to esti-
mate model parameters. For each parameter to be estimated, we use the same priors as in
Eraker et al. (2003). Specifically, we take the mean of the posterior distribution as the param-
eter estimate and the standard deviation of the posterior as the standard error in parentheses.
Parameters κ θ σV ρ λ µS σS µV
SV 0.02158 1.191 0.1799 -0.7147
(0.002676) (0.101) (0.009263) (0.02662)
SVJP 0.01915 1.194 0.1711 -0.7408 0.00938 -1.225 1.533
(0.0023) (0.1051) (0.00817) (0.02623) (0.004502) (0.455) (0.239)
SVJV 0.0288 0.8383 0.1603 -0.7536 0.004617 2.288
(0.003065) (0.07135) (0.009288) (0.02723) (0.001512) (0.3877)
SVCJ 0.02601 0.8337 0.1535 -0.7606 0.004876 -2.556 1.66 2.14
(0.003099) (0.07424) (0.008128) (0.02758) (0.00148) (0.5633) (0.2802) (0.3571)
These reported parameters are quite informative. Table 3.3 shows that the values
of the daily variance θ are 1.191, 1.194, 0.8383 and 0.8337, respectively, for the SV,
SVJP, SVJV and SVCJ models, which are close to the unconditionally sampled stan-
dard deviation of the S&P500 return data, 1.13012. In the annualized view, the sam-
pled standard deviation of data is 17.940.27 Using the jump-adjusted
√
252(κθ + λµV )/κ,
the estimates of annualized volatility are 17.324, 17.381, 17.427 and 17.641, respec-
tively, for the SV, SVJP and SVCJ models. We find that the SVCJ model is closest to
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Corresponding to S&P500 parameter estimates in Table III in Eraker et al. (2003),
adding more jumps in the model leads to the lower estimated values of θ, σV , but a
higher value of ρ. In addition, we verify our MCMC codes with other literature in
Appendix 3.6.2.
Figure 3.3: Latent volatility.
This figure displays the time series of the annualized latent instantaneous volatility esti-
mated under the physical measure based on the SVCJ model. We express the volatility in
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Date
Following Neumann et al. (2016), we present the latent volatility implied by the
MCMC based on the SVCJ model in Figure 3.3. During the 2008 financial crisis,
the instantaneous volatility has rapid movements from September to October 2008.
The means of the daily variance are 1.1563, 1.1213, 1.1975 and 1.1848, respectively,
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for the SV, SVJP, SVJV and SVCJ models.28 The time series of the annualized latent
instantaneous volatility is consistent with Neumann et al. (2016).
3.4.2 Equilibrium Model-implied ERP and VRP
In order to get the risk-neutral parameters implied in our equilibrium model, we
have to convert the daily percentage estimates into annualized values in Table 3.4.29
This is because the preference’s parameters, γ, ψ and β, are annualized values in
the existing literature (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004); Drechsler and Yaron (2011);
Drechsler (2013); Jin (2015) and others). Here we set β = − ln(0.999), which is same
as Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Drechsler (2013). The risk-free rate r = 0.3507(%)
is the average three-month Treasury bill adjusted by the U.S. inflation rate over the
same period, 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016 (for summary statistics, see Table
3.1).
Table 3.4: Annualized S&P 500 Parameter Estimates.
The data are from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. Annual decimals are converted by
scaling: 252κ, 252θ/10000, 252σV /100, 252λ, µS/100, σS/100 and 252µV /10000 except for ρ.
Parameters κ θ σV ρ λ µS σS µV
SV 5.43816 0.03001 0.4533 -0.7147
SVJP 4.82580 0.03009 0.4312 -0.7408 2.36376 -0.01225 0.01533
SVJV 7.2576 0.02113 0.4040 -0.7536 1.1635 0.05766
SVCJ 6.55452 0.02101 0.3868 -0.7606 1.228752 -0.02556 0.0166 0.05393
We now adjust the values of RRA and EIS to fit the mean of ERP in Table 3.1,
and we show the results in Figure 3.4. All results use the MCMC spot variance.
Neumann et al. (2016) do a comparison analysis for the MCMC spot variance and
28The means of the annualized variance are 0.02914, 0.02826, 0.03018 and 0.02986, respectively, for
the SV, SVJP, SVJV and SVCJ models.
29A detailed guide for the conversion of parameters can be found in Appendix 3.6.3 of Branger and
Hansis (2015).
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the spot variance estimated by the options data. They find that there is very lit-
tle difference. We compare the results by using the MCMC spot variance and the
10,000 model simulations and find that there is very little to distinguish between the
two sets. This is because the MCMC spot variance is the mean of 90,000 MCMC
simulations, which is equivalent to or even better than the average variance ob-
tained from 10,000 model Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. As the means of the an-
nualized variance, EV , implied by the MCMC, in the equation system (3.29) are
0.02914, 0.02826, 0.03018 and 0.02986, respectively, for the SV, SVJP, SVJV and SVCJ
models, given all parameters and γ, we are able to explicitly solve a and ψ from the
equation system (3.29).
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Model-implied Equity Premium.
We set the equilibrium model parameters as β = − ln(0.999) and r = 0.3507(%). The mean
of the annualized ERP, 6.4299, is from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. The risk-free
rate r = 0.3507 is the average three-month Treasury bill over the same period. The means
of the annualized variance, EV , implied by the MCMC, in the equation system (3.29) are
0.02914, 0.02826, 0.03018 and 0.02986, respectively, for the SV, SVJP, SVJV and SVCJ models.
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Two vertical dash lines in Figure 3.4 are the solutions of EIS for given RRA=1.008,
in order to fit the market average ERP (which is the horizontal dashed line).30 Figure
3.4 shows that (i) the solutions of a are all positive, which means that the equation
system (3.29) is well-posed so that the DVRP is always negative (see Remark 4); (ii)
higher RRA, higher a and the average ERP; (iii) all of the above models can easily
explain the equity premium puzzle in our cost-free production economy by using
very low RRA.
We calculate the average VRP based on the equation system (3.29) by using the
same parameters and then get Figure 3.5.
30We choose RRA=1.008 because when RRA > 1.008, ERP is larger than 6.4299 for any EIS ≥ 0,
based on the SV model. Then, we get a calibration with Epstein–Zin preferences for late resolution of
uncertainty (e.g., RRA < 1/EIS).
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Model-implied Variance Risk Pre-
mium.
We set the equilibrium model parameters as β = − ln(0.999), γ = 1.008 and r = 0.3507(%).
The mean of the one-month VRP, −10.7884, is from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016.
The risk-free rate r = 0.3507 is the average three-month Treasury bill over the same period.
The means of the annualized variance, EV , implied by the MCMC, in the equation system
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Panel D: SVCJ model
From Table 3.1, the market average VRP is −10.7884. In order to fit the average
VRP, we need large EIS, while, at same time, it leads to a large average ERP in Figure
3.4. We draw the solutions of EIS, which fit the market average ERP, in Figure 3.5
(i.e., the vertical dashed line) and then we get the explained VRP. We provide the
exact solutions in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5: Model-implied Variance Risk Premium.
We set the equilibrium model parameters as β = − ln(0.999), γ = 1.008 and r = 0.0730(%).
The mean of the one-month VRP, −10.7884, is from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016.
E[V RPVD] V RPPJ V RPV J Model-based E[V RP ] E[V RP ] Explanation rate
SV Model (ψ = 0.04, a = 3.7036)
-0.9829 0 0 -0.9829 -10.7884 9.1%
SVJP Model (ψ = 0.14, a = 3.8620)
-0.9284 -0.0212 0 -0.9496 -10.7884 8.8%
SVJV Model (ψ = 0.44, a = 3.6721)
-0.7583 -1.2433 -2.0016 -10.7884 18.55%
SVCJ Model (ψ = 0.17, a = 3.0432)
-0.6350 -0.2346 -0.9613 -1.8308 -10.7884 16.97%
Based on Table 3.5, the SVJV model works best among four affine models to fit
the market average VRP.31 It reveals that jumps in the volatility process are the most
important factor to explain the VRP. This is why the SVCJ and SVJV models work
much better than the SV and SVJP models. However, compared with the period
in Broadie et al. (2007) (1990–1999), in the large sample period with a low average
ERP, our model works less well. This is a limitation of our cost-free production-
based equilibrium model. Considering the property of the equilibrium, one way
of improving the model’s explanation performance is to add more risks (i.e., jump
and diffusive risks). For example, if we assume that the long-term mean level of Vt
and the jump intensity in SVJV model also follow the mean-reverting square root
process, then the ERP in Equation (3.27) will not acquire any new risks, while the
VRP in Equation (3.28) will acquire two more diffusive risks.
Combining Figure 3.4 and 3.5, given γ = 1.008, based on the SVJV model, we
have V RP = −8.4371,−9.8824,−12.1473 and−16.2199, andERP = 11.3693, 11.8874,
31The explanation rate = E[V RP ](Model)
E[V RP ](Data) × 100%.
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12.5279 and 13.3505 when ψ = 0.94, 0.95, 0.96 and 0.97, respectively.32 The VRP is
more sensitive than the ERP in a large EIS domain. Thus, only if the average ERP is at
or larger than 11, the equation system (3.29) has available solutions with restrictions
γ > 1, ψ > 0 and 0 < a < 1/µV .
For two subsamples with a large average ERP, 1990–1999 and 2010–2016, in Table
3.1, we just respectively choose ψ = 0.965 and ψ = 0.95 both with γ = 1.008 and
then the SVJV model can well explain such a high ERP and VRP on average (i.e.,
for periods 1990–1999 and 2010–2016, data V RP = −14.5477,−9.4441, while the
model V RP = −13.8450,−8.4371; data ERP = 12.3619, 11.3884, while the model
ERP = 12.9112, 11.3693).
Overall, all models built in our cost-free production economy can perfectly ex-
plain the the equity premium puzzle with much low risk aversion. The SVCJ and
SVJV models can explain both the larger ERP and VRP only if the average annual-
ized ERP is at or larger than 11% (e.g., for the periods 1990–1999 and 2010–2016).
3.4.3 Other implements of the model
Volatility market.
Eraker and Wu (2017) use a consumption-based equilibrium to explain the negative
returns of V IX futures and other volatility claims. Our model also can explain it.
Based on Equation (3.4), we can get the formula for CBOE VIX:


















32As the SVCJ model works similarly to the SVJV model, we only discuss the SVJV model here.
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and the risk-neutral parameters can be obtained by using the transition in (3.23).
For example, for the SVCJ model, we set γ = 1.1 and ψ = 0.43, and then we get
a = 10.0438, κQ = 0.01876, λQ = 0.01094, µQS = −2.5863 and µ
Q
V = 4.6688. By using
the MCMC spot volatility, we can generate the model-implied VIX in Figure 3.6 and
give the summary statistic in Table 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Equilibrium model-implied VIX in the SVCJ
model.
The VIX is from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. We set the equilibrium model pa-
rameters as β = − ln(0.999), r = 0.0730(%), γ = 1.1 and ψ = 0.78. The physical parameters
are κ = 0.02601, θ = 0.8337, σV = 0.1535, ρ = −0.7606, λ = 0.004876, µS = −2.556, σS =
1.66, µV = 2.14 and the risk neutral parameters are κQ = 0.01876, λQ = 0.01094, µQS =
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Table 3.6: Equilibrium model-implied VIX in the SVCJ
model.
The VIX is from 02 January 1990 to 30 September 2016. We set the equilibrium model pa-
rameters as β = − ln(0.999), r = 0.0730(%), γ = 1.1 and ψ = 0.43. The physical parameters
are κ = 0.02601, θ = 0.8337, σV = 0.1535, ρ = −0.7606, λ = 0.004876, µS = −2.556, σS =
1.66, µV = 2.14 and the risk neutral parameters are κQ = 0.01876, λQ = 0.01094, µQS =
−2.5863 and µQV = 4.6688.
V IX (Data) V IX (Model) RV (Data) RV (Model) V RP (Data) V RP (Model)
Mean 19.7273 19.7178 26.7926 25.9393 -10.7884 -10.7868
Std 7.8622 6.0230 47.6415 29.9255 34.2257 2.1751
Skewness 2.1053 3.6603 6.9652 6.4735 6.1047 -6.4735
Kurtosis 10.7107 22.9600 64.9391 57.3278 79.8023 57.3278
Based on Figure 3.6 and Table 3.6, the SVCJ model built in our cost-free pro-
duction economy can well capture the dynamics of the VIX index. By using the VIX
future pricing formula in Zhu and Lian (2012), we are able to get the prices of VIX fu-
tures with different maturities and their returns, which are close to the market data.
Thus, the SVCJ model (or SVJP model) built in a cost-free production economy can
well explain the negative returns of V IX futures and other volatility claims, with
low RRA and EIS.
Option market.
Based on our production-based equilibrium model, we are able to price the options
(including index options, equity options, VIX options and others). Following Bates
(1991, 1996, 2000); Liu et al. (2005); Zhang et al. (2012); Fu and Yang (2012), given the
stock process in (3.3), once we have an explicit transition between the risk-neutral
measure Q and the physical probability measure P in (3.23), we can price any options
in the risk-neutral measure Q. Unlike Duffie et al. (2000), we provide a clear and
explicit transition between the two measures, which are implied by a production-
based equilibrium model.




This chapter discusses the equity and variance risk premiums in a cost-free production-
based economy with one representative investor who has a recursive preference. Af-
ter solving the equilibrium, we provide an explicit transition for model parameters
between the risk-neutral measure and the physical probability measure. This transi-
tion documents that the diffusive volatility risk premium should be negative. Then,
for the data period in Broadie et al. (2007), the SVCJ model built in our cost-free
production economy can perfectly explain the equity premium puzzle and the large
negative VRP. For the longer data period, the SVJV model works best in terms of
explaining the VRP, and we find that the SVJV and SVCJ models are able to explain
both large ERP and VRP when the ERP is large than 11% (e.g., the periods, 1990–1999
and 2010–2016).
In contrast to Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Drechsler (2013)
who use a long-run risks model, and Buraschi et al. (2014) who use a two-tree Lucas
(1978) economy with two heterogeneous investors, we employ a simpler cost-free
production-based equilibrium model to explain the large equity and variance risk
premiums. Our analysis in this chapter can be extended to study the skewness risk
premium (e.g., Neuberger (2012); Kozhan, Neuberger, and Schneider (2013)).
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1













σ2V V JV V + σV ρuWV JWV + λE [J(W + uW (e
x − 1), V + y)− J ]
}
. (3.37)
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This leads to the two first-order conditions (FOCs):
fc(c, J)− JW = 0, (3.38)
(φ− λm)WJW + uW 2V JWW + σV ρWV JWV ,
+ λE [JW (W (1 + (e
x − 1)u), V + y)W (ex − 1)] = 0. (3.39)





(WV JWW + σV ρV JWV + λE [JW (We
x, V + y)(ex − 1)]) . (3.40)
In addition, from (3.38), we can solve the optimal consumption rate:
c∗t =
(
JW [(1− γ)J ]ω−1 β−1
)−ψ
. (3.41)











− c∗JW + rWJW −
1
2




σ2V V JV V + λE [J(We
x, V + y)− J ]− λE [WJW (Wex, V + y)(ex − 1)] .
(3.42)
We conjecture the value function has the following form:




where a > 0 and γ > 1 (similar assumptions see Zhou and Zhu (2012); Wachter
(2013)).
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Substituting the conjectured value function in (3.43) into (2.5) and the PDE (3.42), the
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Using the affine approximation method (e.g., see Benzoni et al. (2011)), we expand
the exponential term in V near their long term mean level V = κθ+λE[y]κ , e
−ψω(aV+b) ≈























− (1− γ)λE [eay−γx(ex − 1)] ,







Plugging (3.43) into (3.40), we get the equity premium as
φt = (γ − σV ρa)Vt + λE
[
(1− e−γx+ay)(ex − 1)
]
, (3.47)
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where the constant r satisfies







Plugging Γt in Equation (3.54) with the equity premium φt in Equation (3.47) into











+ r (1− γ) + γ (1− γ) 1
2
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We find that Equation (3.57) implied by the pricing kernel and Equation (3.45) im-
plied by HJB equation are totally the same. According to Benzoni et al. (2011), this is
because the pricing kernel we assume in (3.49) is identical to the HJB equation (2.4).
As BS,t and BV,t are a pair of correlated Brownian motions with correlation co-
efficient ρ, according to Girsanov’s theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 1.32 and Theorem
1.34, Øksendal and Sulem (2007)), we present the transition between the risk-neutral
measure Q and the physical probability measure P,
dBQS,t =dBS,t + (γ − aρσV )
√
Vtdt,




Vtdt = dBV,t + (ργ − aσV )
√
Vtdt,














As Equation (3.46) can yield multiple solutions to a and b, we select a with the re-
striction, a < 1/µV , to make sure λQ > 0. The empirical results in Eraker (2004);
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Broadie et al. (2007); Neumann et al. (2016), µQV > µV , suggest the restriction a > 0
as µV > 0.
3.6.2 A Comparison of Our Codes
In order to verify the accuracy of our MCMC codes, we present the replicated es-
timates by using the same sample in Eraker et al. (2003) and Yun (2011) with our
MCMC codes based on OpenBUGS,33 which are used in Section 3.4. We discard the
first 10,000 runs as the “burn-in”period and use the last 100,000 iterations in MCMC
simulations to estimate model parameters. Specifically, we take the mean of the
posterior distribution as the parameter estimate and the standard deviation of the
posterior as the standard error in parentheses.
As the jumps of the SVCJ model in Eraker et al. (2003) are correlated, we only
present the estimates of the SV and SVJP models. As a complementary comparison,
we compare our estimates of the SV, SVJP and SVCJ models with Yun’s (2011), which
are estimated by using WinBUGS. From Table 3.7 and 3.8, we can confirm that our
MCMC codes based on OpenBUGS can estimate similar model parameters with a
very small difference to Eraker et al. (2003) and Yun (2011).
33The reason we choose OpenBUGS instead of WinBUGS is that OpenBUGS running
is faster and more functional. For changes between WinBUGS and OpenBUGS, see
http://www.openbugs.net/w/OpenVsWin.
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
98
Table 3.7: A comparison with Eraker et al. (2003).
We present the replicated estimates by using the same MCMC methodology and the sample
in Eraker et al. (2003) with our MCMC codes based on OpenBUGS, which will be used in
Section 3.4. We discard the first 10,000 runs as the “burn-in”period and use the last 90,000
iterations in MCMC simulations to estimate model parameters. For each parameter to be
estimated, we use the same priors as in Eraker et al. (2003). Specifically, we take the mean
of the posterior distribution as the parameter estimate and the standard deviation of the
posterior as the standard error in parentheses.
Model κ θ σV ρ λ µS σS
SV Eraker et al. (2003) 0.0231 0.9052 0.1434 -0.3974
(0.0068) (0.1077) (0.0128) (0.0516)
Our estimates 0.02889 0.9002 0.1544 -0.407
(0.00524) (0.07645) (0.01185) (0.0502)
SVJP Eraker et al. (2003) 0.0128 0.8136 0.0954 -0.4668 0.0060 -2.5862 4.0720
(0.0039) (0.1244) (0.0104) (0.057) (0.0021) (1.3034) (1.7210)
Our estimates 0.01979 0.8534 0.1184 -0.479 0.005394 -2.978 4.046
(0.004218) (0.08437) (0.0106) (0.05199) (0.00201) (1.304) (0.7853)
Table 3.8: A comparison to Yun (2011).
We present the replicated estimates by using same MCMC methodology and the sample
in Yun (2011) with our MCMC codes based on OpenBUGS, which will be used in Section
3.4. We discard the first 10,000 runs as “burn-in”period and use the last 90,000 iterations in
MCMC simulations to estimate model parameters. For each parameter to be estimated, we
use the same priors as in Eraker et al. (2003). Specifically, we take the mean of the posterior
distribution as parameter estimate and the standard deviation of the posterior as standard
error in parentheses.
Model κ θ σV ρ λ µS σS µV
SV Yun (2011) 0.0288 1.0210 0.1813 -0.4960
(0.0052) (0.1133) (0.0128) (0.0528)
Our estimates 0.02796 1.051 0.1811 -0.4904
(0.005127) (0.1168) (0.01303) (0.05238)
SVJP Yun (2011) 0.0204 0.9856 0.1450 -0.5912 0.0066 -3.3490 3.7040
(0.0048) (0.1340) (0.0132) (0.0511) (0.0025) (1.4190) (0.7329)
Our estimates 0.0184 1.055 0.1423 -0.5838 0.006439 -3.389 3.976
(0.0046644) (0.1548) (0.01364) (0.05226) (0.002371) (1.461) (0.8397)
SVCJ Yun (2011) 0.0362 0.7026 0.1459 -0.5712 0.0049 -4.6460 2.7100 2.1040
(0.0060) (0.0711) (0.0131) (0.0500) (0.0017) (1.1250) (0.8013) (0.4025)
Our estimates 0.03495 0.7216 0.1451 -0.5611 0.005264 -4.149 2.514 2.044
(0.005897) (0.07657) (0.01199) (0.0582) (0.001824) (1.18) (0.6005) (0.3855)
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3.6.3 ERP and VRP in Broadie et al. (2007)
Model-implied VRP
Table 3.9: Estimates in Broadie et al. (2007).
The physical measure parameters estimated by Eraker et al. (2003) with sample (1980 to
1999). The risk-neutral parameters estimated by options on S&P 500 futures with sample
(1987 to 2003). The parameter values correspond to daily percentage returns.
Model κ θ σV ρ λ µS σS µV κQ µQS µ
Q
V
SV 0.023 0.90 0.14 -0.40 0.028
SVJP 0.013 0.81 0.10 -0.47 0.006 -2.59 4.07 0.023 -9.97
SVCJ 0.026 0.54 0.08 -0.48 0.006 -2.63 2.89 1.48 0.056 -6.58 10.81
We use the estimates in Broadie et al. (2007) (see Table 3.9) to calculate the model-
implied VRP and use the returns of the S&P 500 index to calculate the real variance
risk premium based on Definition 3.2.1 (for summary statistics, see Table 3.1). In
Table 3.10, we find that the SVJP and SVCJ models with their estimates can well
fit the real VRP (the mean in 1990–1999 is −14.5477). This gives us the motivation
that the simple SVJP or SVCJ model built in our cost-free production economy may
explain the high negative VRP.
Table 3.10: Model-implied Variance Risk Premium in Broadie
et al. (2007).
We report simulated statistics based on 10,000 simulations, with each statistic calculated
using a sample size equal to its VRP data counterpart. We report the mean of the VRP from
1990 to 1999, which is the overlapping period between Eraker et al. (2003) and Broadie et al.
(2007) after VIX launched.
Model E[V RPVD] V RPPJ V RPV J E[V RP ] (Model) E[V RP ] (Data) Explanation rate
SV 0.8241 0 0 0.8241 -14.5477 -
SVJP 1.5341 -11.6793 0 -10.1452 -14.5477 69.73%
SVCJ 3.8162 -4.5838 -8.3754 -9.1430 -14.5477 62.85%
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Equilibrium Model-implied ERP and VRP
We set the equilibrium model parameters as β = − ln(0.999) and γ = 1.1, which is
much lower than in the existing literature (e.g., 9.5 in Drechsler and Yaron (2011); 5 in
Drechsler (2013)). The risk-free rate r = 1.8421(%) is the average three-month Trea-
sury bill adjusted by the U.S. inflation rate over the same period, 02 January 1990 to
31 December 1999 (for summary statistics, see Table 3.1). The physical model param-
eters are given in Broadie et al. (2007) (i.e., Table 3.9). The mean of the annualized
log S&P500 returns, 14.2040, is from 1990 to 1999 which is the overlapping period
between Eraker et al. (2003) (1980–1999) and Broadie et al. (2007) (1987-2003) after
VIX launched. Thus, the mean of the ERP is 12.3619, We report simulated statistics in
Table 3.11 and 3.13 based on 10,000 simulations, with each statistic calculated using
a sample size equal to its ERP and VRP data counterpart.
Table 3.11: Equilibrium Model-implied Equity Premium in
Broadie et al. (2007).
We set the equilibrium model parameters as β = − ln(0.999), r = 1.8421(%). We report
simulated statistics based on 10,000 simulations, with each statistic calculated using a sample
size equal to its market equity premium data counterpart. The mean of the annualized ERP,
12.3619, is from 1990 to 1999 which is the overlapping period between Eraker et al. (2003)
and Broadie et al. (2007) after VIX launched. The risk-free rate r = 1.8421 is the average
three-month Treasury bill rate adjusted by U.S. inflation rate over the same period, 1990 to
1999.
E[ERPPD] ERPPJ E[ERP ] (Model) E[ERP ] (Data)
SV Model (γ = 1.1, ψ = 0.70, a = 30.4081)
12.2679 0 12.2679 12.3619
SVJP Model(γ = 1.1, ψ = 0.80, a = 39.5584)
11.8854 0.3885 12.2740 12.3619
SVCJ Model (γ = 1.1, ψ = 0.58, a = 16.1155)
5.9040 6.4587 12.3627 12.3619
Chapter 3. Equilibrium Equity and Variance Risk Premiums in a Cost-free
Production Economy
101
Using the annualized estimates, we adjust ψ to fit the mean of the ERP in Table
3.11 and then we get the best ψ and the annualized risk-neutral parameters. We
convert it into daily percentage estimates in Table 3.12.
Table 3.12: Model-implied risk-neutral parameters in Broadie
et al. (2007).
The estimates correspond to daily percentage changes in the index value.




SVJP 0.002514 0.006180 -6.9860
SVCJ 0.02298 0.015489 -6.8591 3.7097
Here we discuss the parameters transition of the SVCJ model between the risk-
neutral measure Q and the physical probability measure P in details. In the physical
measure, κ = 0.026, λ = 0.006, µS = −2.63 and µV = 1.48 given in Table 3.9,
while in the risk-neutral measure, κQ = 0.02298, λQ = 0.015489, µQS = −6.8591 and
µQV = 3.7097 shown in Table 3.12. Based on that, our production-based equilibrium
reveals that the DVRP, κQ − κ = −0.0038 < 0, should be negative. From (3.23),
we know that κQ − κ = (ργ − aσV )σV < 0 for γ > 1 and 0 < a < 1/µV . In
addition, in the risk-neutral probability measure, we have a more negative mean of
jump size in the price and a larger mean of jump size in the volatility. Furthermore,
the transition suggests that the estimate of the jump intensity in the risk-neutral
probability measure should be larger than in the physical probability measure. It
will contribute part of the jump risk premium in the variance risk premium and the
equality premium. Thus, here we suggest again that the risk-neutral parameter λQ
should be estimated. Finally, we use the same annualized parameters to calculate
the VRP in Table 3.13.
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Table 3.13: Equilibrium Model-implied Variance Risk Pre-
mium in Broadie et al. (2007).
We set the equilibrium model parameters as β = − ln(0.999). We report simulated statis-
tics based on 10,000 simulations, with each statistic calculated using a sample size equal to
its VRP data counterpart. We report the mean of the VRP from 1990 to 1999 which is the
overlapping period between Eraker et al. (2003) and Broadie et al. (2007) after VIX launched.
The risk-free rate r = 1.8421 is the average three-month Treasury bill adjusted by the U.S.
inflation rate over the same period, 1990 to 1999.
E[V RP V D] V RPPJ V RP V J E[V RP ] (Model) E[V RP ] (Data) Explanation rate
SV Model (γ = 1.1, ψ = 0.70, a = 30.4081)
-2.9572 0 0 -2.9572 -14.5477 20.33%
SVJP Model (γ = 1.1, ψ = 0.80, a = 39.5584)
-1.8512 -0.2146 0 -2.0657 -14.5477 14.20%
SVCJ Model (γ = 1.1, ψ = 0.58, a = 16.1155)
-0.4707 -3.2024 -9.2100 -12.8832 -14.5477 88.56%
From Table 3.11 and 3.13, we conclude that over the same period, 1990 to 1999,
the SVCJ model built in our cost-free production economy can explain not only the
high ERP but also the large VRP on average ( the explanation rate is 88.56%). In
other words, our model works well for extremely high ERP (e.g., E[ERP ] > 11). In
addition, Table 3.13 examines the fraction of the VRP explained by the three com-
ponents. We find that the jump VRP (especially the volatility jump VRP) explains
around 71.45% of the total VRP. This is close to Li and Zinna (2017), who calculate




Model of Volatility Trading
This chapter is joint work with Jin E. Zhang. It has been accepted for presentation
at 2017 Auckland Finance Meeting, 18-20 December 2017, AUT, Queenstown, New
Zealand.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is the first to provide a demand-based equilibrium model of volatil-
ity trading with three kinds of traders (i.e., dealers, asset managers and leveraged
funds), which complements Eraker and Wu’s (2017) consumption-based equilib-
rium model. According to Mixon and Onur (2015), volatility derivatives are mainly
traded by three kinds of traders: dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds. Deal-
ers as market makers balance the orders of volatility derivatives. Asset managers as
hedgers prefer to take long positions, while leveraged funds as speculators prefer to
take short positions. Mixon and Onur (2015) collect the daily volatility derivatives
transaction data from the Swap Data Repositories (SDR) reported by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and find that the gross vega notional outstand-
ing for variance swaps, in 2014, is over USD 2 billion, with USD 1.5 billion in S&P 500
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variance swaps. From Bollen, O’Neill, and Whaley (2017), the dollar value of open
interest of the CBOE Market Volatility Index (VIX) futures in 2013 is around USD 7
billion, and the dollar market value of VIX Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) linked
to the short-term S&P 500 VIX futures index is around USD 2 billion. The market
for volatility trading has become an important new avenue of financial markets in
addition to equity and fixed income securities over last decade.
However, since 2009, according to Whaley (2013), there has been a huge loss
of investing in positive multiplier VIX Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs) (e.g., iPath
S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures ETN (VXX)). This is because of the negative return
of VIX futures (Eraker and Wu (2017)). In this chapter, we mainly investigate the
question: How do volatility trading activities affect the VRP and the VIX futures’
price and return? By using an equilibrium model of volatility trading, we provide
an economic theory to explain that the lower positions (more net short) of dealers,
the lower short positions of leverage funds and the higher long positions of asset
managers lead to a higher VIX futures price and a more negative VIX futures return,
so that the positive multiplier VIX ETNs produce a huge loss. This is different from
the explanation in Eraker and Wu (2017), which states that the negative futures re-
turn is only determined by the investors risk aversion. Besides considering the risk
aversion, adding the trading behaviour of the three main traders complement their
consumption-based equilibrium model. The novel model proposed in this chapter
is our main contribution. Furthermore, empirically we use the weekly Traders in
Financial Futures (TFF) reports data to test the impact of trading on the VIX futures
return. These results are new.
In terms of demand-based equilibrium models, Garleanu et al. (2009) propose
a demand-based equilibrium model for option pricing, with two kinds of agents:
dealers and end users. Dong (2016) extends their model to explain how the demand
for ETPs demand affects the VIX futures price. In contrast to the previous literature,
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our model considers three kinds of traders (i.e., dealers, asset managers and lever-
aged funds) and analyses how traders demand for VIX-linked futures influences the
volatility market. The daily trading data in Mixon and Onur (2015) and the weekly
data used in this chapter strongly support that we should use a three-trader model
instead of the two-trader model.
There are a huge number of papers studying the VRP and its predictive power.
For example, Carr and Wu (2009) find that there exists a large and negative mean of
the VRP on five stock indexes and 35 individual stocks. Recently, González-Urteaga
and Rubio (2016) have discussed and tested the volatility risk premium at the indi-
vidual and portfolio level. Barras and Malkhozov (2016) formally compare the mar-
ket VRP inferred from equity and option markets.1 However, there is a paucity of
research on predicting the VRP empirically. Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2016)
compare four predicting models and find that the trading activity model is the best
performing. Fan, Imerman, and Dai (2016) claim that the magnitude of VRP is sig-
nificantly affected by investors’ demand for hedging tail risk. Two papers do not
use the explicit trading positions of dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds as
predictive variables. For example, Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2016) use the
trading volume of all S&P 500 futures contracts and the TED spread to explain the
high negative VRP. In this chapter, we test the impacts of the trading positions of the
three main traders and find that the high negative VRP is driven by the higher short
positions of dealers, the lower short positions of leverage funds and the higher long
positions of asset managers in variance swaps. This is new empirical evidence. In
addition, our theoretical model also gives a very neat economic theory to explain the
1Furthermore, Todorov (2010); Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) use the rare events to account for the
large average VRP. Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2015); Li and Zinna (2017) examine the term structures of the VRP.
Choi, Mueller, and Vedolin (2017) study variance risk premiums in the bond market. Bollerslev et al.
(2015); Jin (2015) and others study the predictive power of the VRP for the stock return, while Londono
and Zhou (2017) recently provide evidence of the predictive power of the VRP for the currency return.
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new empirical evidence.2
This chapter makes at least two contributions. First, it is the first paper to provide
a demand-based equilibrium model of volatility trading with three kinds of traders
(i.e., dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds) that fully supports the existing
empirical results. Second, due to our novel model, this chapter is the first to test
the impact of the three main traders net positions on the VRP and the VIX futures
return.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the
model and results, and Section 4.3 provides two endogenous cases. Section 4.4 gives
the empirical analysis. Section 4.5 concludes. Appendix 4.6.1 collects all proofs, and
Appendix 4.6.2 gives solutions for the endogenous cases.
4.2 Models and results
4.2.1 Heston model
We set up our demand-based equilibrium model starting from the Heston (1993)
model, which is the most popular stochastic volatility model in the literature. We
adopt it to describe the dynamics of the stock price (i.e., S&P 500 Index (SPX)) in the











where vt is the instantaneous variance; BS,t and Bv,t are a pair of correlated Brow-
nian motions with correlation coefficient ρ. Empirical evidence documents that ρ
2Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011); Bollerslev et al. (2012); Drechsler (2013); Jin
(2015) adopt the long-run risks model (i.e., long-run risks and investor preferences) to explain the neg-
ative VRP and Buraschi et al. (2014) use a two-tree Lucas (1978) economy with two heterogeneous
investors (i.e., disagreement). In contrast to them, we use the trading positions of dealers, asset man-
agers and leveraged funds to explain the high VRP.
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is negative for SPX, so that here we assume −1 < ρ < 0 (e.g., Eraker et al. (2003);
Eraker (2004) and Broadie et al. (2007)).
















where λ(S, v,Θ, t) represents the market price of the volatility risk and Θ captures
the volatility trading activities,4 and










The above transformation between the physical measure P and the risk-neutral mea-
sure Q indicates that the pricing kernel (or state-price density) πt must satisfy,
dπt
πt








In Heston (1993), he assumes λ(S, v,Θ, t) as λ(S, v, t).5 It means that the market
price of the volatility risk is determined only by the stock price and its volatility. In
our setting, besides the stock price and its volatility, the volatility trading activities
contributes to the market price of the volatility risk as well.
We simplify the Heston (1993) model based on the following assumptions.
3To be clear, all notions (e.g., Brownian motion, conditional expectation, conditional variance and
conditional covariance) with superscript ·Q throughout the chapter are in the risk-neutral measure Q,
while all notions without superscript ·Q are in the physical measure P.






vt is fixed, then
λ(S, v,Θ, t) is able to measure the magnitude of the market price of the volatility risk.
5Furthermore, Heston (1993) just assumes λ(S, v, t) = λvt, where λ is a constant.
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Assumption 4.2.1 To simplify the model, we set
r = 0, κ = 0. (4.5)
In addition,
− 1 < ρ < 0, 0 < σv < 1, (4.6)
which leads to V art(RT ) > |Covt(RT , vT )|whereRT = ln STSt and the conditional variance
and covariance are given in Appendix 4.6.1.
We note that Assumption 4.2.1 is made for notational simplicity only, and is unim-
portant for the conclusions we get below. The results can be extended if we relax the
above assumption.
Under Assumption 4.2.1, we rewrite the dynamics of the stock price in the phys-

























4.2.2 Variance risk premium and the CBOE VIX Index
Given SPX in (4.7), we are able to obtain the annualized realized variance (RV) at time
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EQt [λ(S, v,Θ, u)]du.
(4.10)
According to Carr and Wu’s (2009) definition for the variance risk premium (VRP),
V RPt = RVt − IVt, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Variance risk premium) The VRP at time t during period [t, t+ τ ] can
be defined as





EQt [λ(S, v,Θ, u)]du. (4.11)
Based on the above theorem, the sign of V RPt depends on the sign of λ the more
negative the λ, the more negative the V RPt. The VRP on average is empirically
negative, so that λ should have a negative mean (e.g., Carr and Wu (2009)).
Following the definition of the CBOE VIX Index,6 the VIX Index at time t can
be defined as the product of the square root of the implied variance during period
[t, t+ 21/252] and the notional amount, 100, i.e.,
V IXt =
√







EQt [λ(S, v,Θ, u)]du, (4.12)
where τ = 21/252.
Lemma 4.2.3 Based on simplified Heston (1993), we have the following:
(i) The implied volatility and the CBOE VIX increase with the more negative λ.
(ii) The negative VRP is caused by the negative λ.
(iii) In addition, more negative λ leads to more negative VRP.
6The CBOE VIX white paper can be found at https://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf.
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In Heston’s (1993) setup, the VRP is determined by the average market price of the
volatility risk λ during a future period (t, t,+τ). In addition, the implied volatility
and CBOE VIX are contributed by λ. This is the key to link the VRP and the existing
risks in the financial market. In this chapter, the risks are from the traders’ holdings
in volatility products, i.e., Θ. However, for different purposes, we could set is so that
λ is related to other market risks.
4.2.3 Volatility market
As Heston (1993) mentioned, any derivatives with the particular payoff function UT





















The value of the derivative is determined by the market price of the volatility risk
λ. Here we assume that there is a volatility derivative, i.e., V IX2 futures, written on
the square of the CBOE VIX Index with the maturity date T .7 Then, its fair price at

































Applying Itô’s Lemma to F V IX
2











7V IX2 futures can be regarded as a proxy of VIX futures because they have similar properties.
The reason we use V IX2 futures instead of VIX futures is that the pricing formula of V IX2 futures is
more tractable. The tractable formula produces a lot of intuitions in Section 4.2.5. It can be extended
into VIX futures without affecting the main results in the chapter.
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[λ(S, v,Θ, t)dt+ σv
√
vtdBv,t] . (4.16)
From (4.16), we can get the expected return of V IX2 futures as follows.
























t [λ(S, v,Θ, u)]du
.
(4.17)
This indicates that the return of V IX2 futures depends on the average λ during
future periods (t, t + τ) and (T, T + τ); the negative λ leads to a negative return of
V IX2 futures. In addition, the value of V IX2 futures basis at time t can be solved
in the following.
Theorem 4.2.5 (V IX2 futures basis) The value of V IX2 futures basis at time t is
BasisV IX
2
t,T ≡ F V IX
2











EQt [λ(S, v,Θ, u)]du−
∫ T+τ
T




Lemma 4.2.6 Based on simplified Heston (1993), we have the following:
(i) The price of the V IX2 futures increases with more negative λ.
(ii) The negative return of the V IX2 futures is caused by the negative λ.
(iv) More negative λ leads to more negative return of V IX2 futures.
(v) In addition, more negative λ leads to more positive V IX2 futures basis.
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In Heston’s (1993) framework, the variables related to the volatility of the underlying
are affected by the market price of the volatility risk λ. In other words, once we
determine the value of λ, we are able to price any volatility derivatives in Heston’s
(1993) model.
4.2.4 The market price of the volatility risk and traders
In the economy, there are three kinds of traders: dealers (market makers), asset man-
agers (hedgers) and leveraged funds (speculators). The trading data of the three
main traders are reported by the Commitments of Traders (COT) reports and the
TFF reports published by CFTC. We consider only a single-period model. There are
2 dates, t and T , where 0 ≤ t < T + τ . All traders make their decisions at time t and
hold it until time T . In detail, the optimal futures positions in volatility markets (i.e.,
V IX2 futures market) of dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds are xt, yt and
zt.
Assumption 4.2.7 We assume the market price of the volatility risk is only related to the
volatility trading activities,
λ(S, v,Θ, t) = λ(Θ, t) := λt. (4.19)
In addition, the market price of the volatility risk is related to the trading strategies of dealers,
xt, i.e.,8
Θ = {x}. (4.20)
Based on the single-period model, the trading strategies xt will never change until date T , so
that we assume λt is time-homogeneous.9
8In reality, the net position of dealers is the sum of net positions of the asset managers and lever-
aged funds. This is why we set Θ = {x} rather than Θ = {x, y, z}.
9In other words, xt is time-homogeneous. That is, xu = xt and λu = λt for any u, where t ≤ u ≤ T ,
so that EQt [λu] = E
Q
t [λt] = λt where t ≤ u ≤ T . As the formulas of futures price and return are
involved in the term
∫ T+τ
T
EQt [λu]du, we further assume λu = λt for any u where T < u ≤ T + τ .
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Under Assumption 4.2.7, for any time u where t ≤ u ≤ T , the implied variance
becomes IVu = vu − λt, and then the VRP is
V RPu = λt; (4.21)





= vu − λt (T − u+ 1) ; (4.22)









and the value of V IX2 futures basis,
BasisV IX
2
u,T = −λt(T − u)× 1002. (4.24)
We consider the following special case in which the market price of volatility λt is in
proportion to dealers’ positions.
Assumption 4.2.8 In particular, we assume
λt = axt + b, (4.25)
where a and b will be solved in equilibrium.10
Assumption 4.2.9 The trading strategies of dealers xt are exogenous.11
10For the multiple-period model, a can be recursively solved; see Garleanu et al. (2009).
11Here we assume the optimal trading orders of dealers xt are exogenous (actually, xt, yt and zt are
all exogenous in this case). As similar idea can be found in, for example, Bansal and Yaron (2004). The
optimal consumption in Bansal and Yaron (2004) is solved from an equilibrium, but it is exogenously
given.
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Leveraged funds (speculators). To take the advantage of the negative return of
V IX2 futures, leveraged funds (speculators) prefer to short V IX2 futures.12 Thus,
we assume their demand of V IX2 futures is yt < 0 at time t.
Asset managers (hedgers). In order to hedge their long positions in the stock mar-
ket, asset managers (hedgers) prefer to long V IX2 futures. Thus, we assume their
demand of V IX2 futures is zt > 0 at time t.
Dealers (market makers). Dealers are risk-averse. They choose the optimal order
φt in stocks and xt in V IX2 futures to maximize the mean-variance preferences with






V art(WD,T ), (4.26)
with terminal wealth process WD,T given by13









where WD,t is their initial wealth and the stock return RT = ln STSt .
Using the V IX2 futures price formula (4.22), the terminal wealth processes of deal-
ers can be rewritten as
WD,T = WD,t + φtStRT + xt [vT − vt + (axt + b)(T − t)]× 1002. (4.28)
12As Mixon and Onur (2015) mentions, leveraged funds always short negative-return VIX futures.
Our empirical results also support this assumption.








. Here we use the continuously
compounded return ln ST
St
to approximate the simple return ST−St
St
, then we get the wealth process
(2.3). This approximation is due to the simplicity of calculating Et[RT ], V art[RT ] and Covt[RT , vT ].
However, whether we use this approximation or not does not change the main results in the chapter.
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Thus, their optimization problem becomes
max
φ,x






t V art[RT ] + x
2
tV art[vT ]× 1004 + 2φtxtStCovt[RT , vT ]× 1002
]
.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) lead to
xt =
b(T − t)− γφtStCovt[RT , vT ]




Et[RT ]− xtγCovt[RT , vT ]× 1002
γStV art[RT ]
, (4.30)
where Covt[RT , vT ], V art[vT ], Et[RT ] and V art[RT ] are shown in Appendix 4.6.1.
We rearrange Equation (4.29) and get
axt =






γφtStCovt[RT , vT ]
2(T − t)
. (4.31)






V ar2t [RT ]− Cov2t [RT , vT ]
)
× 1002
2(T − t)V art[RT ]
)
xt+
Et[RT ]Covt[RT , vT ]− bV art[RT ]
2(T − t)V art[RT ]
.
(4.32)
Under Assumption 4.2.9, xt is an exogenously given random variable. Thus, the




V ar2t [RT ]− Cov2t [RT , vT ]
)
× 1002




Et[RT ]Covt[RT , vT ]
V art[RT ]
< 0. (4.34)
Chapter 4. A Demand-Based Equilibrium Model of Volatility Trading 116
4.2.5 Equilibrium
Definition 4.2.1 (Volatility market equilibrium I) Equilibrium in our economy is de-
fined in a standard way: The equilibrium V IX2 futures order xt of dealers is such that
dealers maximize their mean-variance preferences, and the V IX2 futures market is clear,
i.e., xt + yt + zt = 0.
In equilibrium, we summarize all trading activities in futures market as the follow-
ing theorem.
Theorem 4.2.10 (Benchmark) Under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.9, the equilibrium solutions
are solved as 
λt = axt + b,
a =
γ(V ar2t [RT ]−Cov2t [RT ,vT ])×1002
2(T−t)V art[RT ] > 0,
b = Et[RT ]Covt[RT ,vT ]V art[RT ] < 0,
xt = −yt − zt,
yt < 0, zt > 0,
(4.35)
where xt, yt and zt are all exogenous.
By using Theorem 4.2.10, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.11 (Benchmark) In equilibrium, under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.9,
(i) The larger short position of dealers leads to more negative λt.
(ii) The larger short position of leverage funds, yt, leads to lower negative λt.
(iii) The larger long position of asset managers, zt, leads to more negative λt.
(iv) Higher risk aversion, γ, more negative λt, if xt < 0, and vice versa.
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Lemma 4.2.11 shows how the volatility trading activities influence the market price
of the volatility risk λt. We plug λt into Equation (4.21)-(4.24) and summarize as


























By using Equation (4.36) and Lemma 4.2.3-4.2.11, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.1 (Benchmark) In equilibrium, under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.9
(i) The larger short positions of dealers lead to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures
return, and a higher V IX2 futures price (equivalently, higher V IX2 futures basis).
(ii) The larger short positions of leverage funds lead to less negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a lower V IX2 futures price.
(iii) The larger long positions of asset managers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a higher V IX2 futures price.
(iv) The higher risk aversion of dealers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures
return, and a higher V IX2 futures price if dealers are in a short position.
Mixon and Onur (2015) empirically test part of the results (i)-(iii) in Proposition 4.2.1;
i.e., the futures price is negatively (positively) related to the level of positioning by
dealers (asset managers and leveraged funds). Furthermore, dealers as market mak-
ers balance the futures positions. If buyers (i.e., asset managers) need more hedging
demand than sellers (i.e., leveraged fundss) supply, dealers will issue new futures
for asset managers. In this case, the futures price will be higher and the return will be
negatively lower. The higher risk aversion of dealers leads to more negative futures
return and higher futures price only if dealers are in a short position.
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The economic mechanism is very clear and intuitive. Asset managers as hedgers
have a high demand for volatility derivatives, which raises the volatility derivatives
prices. At the same time, due to the their high demand, asset managers are willing to
pay the high risk premium to hold volatility derivatives. On the sellers side, if lever-
aged funds short more volatility derivatives (i.e., higher supply), it leads to lower
prices of volatility products. Facing the higher supply and lower prices, buyers, of
course, are willing to pay a lower risk premium to hold these risky products. As
the market makers, dealers positions indicate the balance of the supply and demand
of volatility derivatives. If the demand is higher than the supply, dealers will issue
new volatility contracts for buyers. The higher net short positions of dealers imply
the higher demand for volatility derivatives, so that their prices will be higher. In
the same scenario, dealers need to short more volatility contracts in order to cater
to the needs of buyers. If dealers are more risk-averse, however, they will prefer to
short less. Then the supply will be lower and consequently the price will be higher.
Finally, higher prices always lead to a lower return.
If we treat the V IX2 futures as variance swaps, from (i)-(iii) in Proposition 4.2.1,
the model well explains the empirical results in Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos
(2016); i.e., volatility trading activities strongly predict the market VRP. In contrast
to Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2016), who claim that this is because for dealers
holding a short position in index options based on Garleanu et al. (2009), the model
suggests that the high negative VRP is driven by the larger short positions of dealers,
the lower short positions of leverage funds and the larger long positions of asset
managers in variance swaps.
To summarize, the volatility market is affected contemporaneously by three types
of traders: asset managers, leveraged funds and dealers.
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4.3 Endogenous trading strategies
In this section, we endogenize the trading strategies and find that the main conclu-
sions are not changed.
4.3.1 Case I: One-market equilibrium with endogenous trading strategies
In contrast to Assumption 4.2.9, we give a new assumption as follows.
Assumption 4.3.1 The trading strategies of dealers xt are endogenous.14
As xt is endogenous and there is only one equilibrium in the volatility market, we
can not determine the parameters a and b in Assumption 4.2.8. Thus, there are two
solutions to overcome this issue: (i) reducing parameters (e.g., b) and (ii) defining
additional equilibrium in the stock market. We analyse the former in this subsection
and discuss the latter in the next subsection. Then, in order to decrease the number
of unknowns, we change Assumption 4.2.8 as follows.
Assumption 4.3.2 We assume
λt = axt, (4.37)
where a will be solved in equilibrium.
In addition, we relax the assumption that the trading strategies of leveraged funds
and asset managers are endogenous as well. We show the details of their trading
behaviours as follows.
Leveraged funds (speculators). By taking advantage of the negative return of V IX2
futures, leveraged funds (speculators) prefer to short V IX2 futures and only specu-
late on the V IX2 futures market. They choose the optimal order yt in V IX2 futures
14Actually, xt, yt and zt are endogenous, while ψt is exogenous in this case.
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V art(WL,T ), (4.38)
with terminal wealth process WL,T given by









where WL,t is their initial wealth. The terminal wealth processes of dealers can be
rewritten as
WL,T = WL,t + yt [vT − vt + λt(T − t)]× 1002. (4.40)
Thus their optimization problem becomes
max
y
WL,t + yt [λt(T − t)]× 1002 −
γL
2
y2t V art[vt]× 1004.
The FOC leads to
yt =
λt(T − t)
γLV art[vT ]× 1002
< 0 if λt = axt < 0. (4.41)
The position of leveraged funds in the futures market depends on the sign of λt,
which indicates the sign of the V IX2 futures returns. Thus, the short positions in
V IX2 futures of leveraged funds are due to the negative return of futures (i.e., λt <
0).
Asset managers (hedgers). In order to hedge their long positions ψt > 0 in the
stock market, asset managers (hedgers) prefer to long V IX2 futures, due to the nega-
tive correlation between stock return and volatility derivatives. Thus, given ψt > 0
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in stocks, they choose optimal zt in V IX2 futures in order to maximize the mean-






V art(WA,T ), (4.42)
with terminal wealth process WA,T given by









where WA,t is their initial wealth. Similarly, the terminal wealth processes of dealers
can be rewritten as
WA,T = WA,t + ψtStRT + zt [vT − vt + λt(T − t)]× 1002. (4.44)
Thus their optimization problem becomes
max
z






t V art[RT ] + z
2
t V art[vt]× 1004 + 2ψtztStCovt[RT , vT ]× 1002
]
.
The FOC leads to
zt =
λt(T − t)− γAψtStCovt[RT , vT ]
γAV art[vT ]× 1002
=
λt(T − t)
γAV art[vT ]× 1002︸ ︷︷ ︸
negative return of futures
+
−ψtStCovt[RT , vT ]




The positions of asset managers in V IX2 futures are contributed from two compo-
nents. Due to the negative return of V IX2 futures, they try to take short positions.
However, as they hold a bunch of stocks, they have to long V IX2 futures to hedge
their long positions in stocks by using the negative correlation between the stock
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return and the futures price (i.e., Covt[RT , vT ] < 0). Finally, their positions are deter-
mined by the size of the initial wealth in stocks. If ψtSt is large, then zt > 0, and vice
versa. This explains why sometimes asset managers have net short positions in the
volatility market. It is because they may reduce their position in the stock market
and the return of volatility derivatives is deeply negative.
Dealers (market makers). Dealers (market makers) are the same here as in Section
4.2.4. Thus, their optional endogenous trading strategies are
xt =
−γDφtStCovt[RT , vT ]




Et[RT ]− xtγDCovt[RT , vT ]× 1002
γDStV art[RT ]
. (4.47)
Definition 4.3.1 (Volatility market equilibrium II) Equilibrium in our economy is de-
fined in a standard way: The equilibrium V IX2 futures orders of dealers, xt, and the stock
orders of dealers, φt, are such that they maximize their mean-variance preferences; the equi-
librium V IX2 futures orders of leveraged funds, yt , and the equilibrium V IX2 futures
orders of asset managers, zt, are such that they maximize their mean-variance preferences,
and the V IX2 futures market is clear, i.e., xt + yt + zt = 0.
In this case, the competition among the three traders is close to in a von Stack-
elberg game with the dealers as the leader. Dealers propose an “a” in the market
and then asset managers and leveraged funds submit their trading positions of the
V IX2 futures. Finally, dealers as market makers maximize their expected utilities
with the market clearing constriction, xt = −yt − zt, so that an equilibrium “a” is
determined.
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Based on Definition 4.3.1, we summarize the equilibrium as the following theo-
rem.15
Theorem 4.3.3 (Case I) Under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.7 and 4.3.1-4.3.2, the equilibrium





γDV art[vT ]×1002−2a(T−t) ,
φtSt =





γLV art[vT ]×1002 ,
zt =
λt(T−t)−γAψtStCovt[RT ,vT ]
γAV art[vT ]×1002 ,
xt + yt + zt = 0.
(4.48)
The analytical solutions are provided in Appendix 4.6.2.
The equilibrium system (4.48) has six equations with six unknowns, a, λt, xt, yt, zt, φtSt.
Given parameters vt, T−t, µ, ρ, σv, ψtSt, γD, γL, γA, we can easily solve them by most
solvers. All solutions are provided in Appendix 4.6.2. For example, the key param-






t [RT , vT ]− γDψtStV art[RT ]V art[vt]− Et[RT ]V art[vt]
)
× 1002
(T − t) ((γL + γA)Et[RT ]− 2γAγLψtStV art[RT ])
.
(4.49)
We assume their risk aversion as γL < γD < γA. This is because asset managers
are the most risk-averse and want to hedge their risks as much as they can, while
leveraged funds, as speculators, are risk takers, who prefer to sell V IX futures to
gamble on more profits. The risk aversion of dealers lies somewhere between them.
15Even though, in the equilibrium, there are three traders. Asset managers and leveraged funds
submit their orders of volatility products and deals as market makers clear the volatility market. Our
model is essential different to Kyle (1985)-type model which derives equilibrium security prices when
traders have asymmetric information. All traders in our model have symmetric information, while
they have different hedging needs of volatility products.
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To simplify, we fix γD = γ, and then we set γL = γ/δ, γA = γδ, where δ > 1 can be a
measure of risk-averse heterogeneity. Following Aı̈t-Sahalia and Kimmel (2007), we
set ρ = −0.75, σv = 0.5. In addition, we set µ = 0.06, vt = 0.22, T − t = 1, γ = 2, δ = 2
and ψtSt = 1. Then we have a = 161.61 > 0, λt = −0.0094 < 0, xt = −0.58× 10−4 <
0, yt = −0.94× 10−4 < 0, zt = 1.51× 10−4 > 0, φtSt = 0.29.
We analyse the sensitivity of a to other parameters, e.g., the risk-averse hetero-
geneity δ, investment horizon T −t and the initial wealth of asset managers in stocks
ψtSt (equivalently, the demands of asset managers in V IX2 futures). In Figure 4.1,
we find the value of a is always positive. Now we can conclude that, under reason-
able parameter settings, the value of a can be always positive.
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Figure 4.1: The value of parameter a in Case I.
This figure shows the value of a. The benchmark model parameters are as follows: ρ =
−0.75, σv = 0.5, µ = 0.06, vt = 0.22, T − t = 1, γ = 2, δ = 2 and ψtSt = 1.












Panel A: Sensitivity to risk-averse heterogeneity














Panel B: Sensitivity to investment horizon







Panel C: Sensitivity to the initial wealth of asset managers in stocks
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In this case, the sign of λ is purely determined by the net positions of dealers. By
using the positive a and the market clearing condition xt = −yt − zt, we can get the
following lemma, which is similar to Lemma 4.2.11.
Lemma 4.3.4 (Case I) In equilibrium, under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.7 and 4.3.1-4.3.2,
(i) The larger short position of dealers leads to more negative λt.
(ii) The larger short position of leverage funds, yt, leads to lower negative λt.
(iii) The larger long position of asset managers, zt, leads to more negative λt.
Lemma 4.3.4 shows that under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.7 and 4.3.1-4.3.2, the conclu-
sions in Lemma 4.3.4 are not changed, compared with the results (i)-(iii) in Lemma
4.2.11. Similarly, we plug λt into Equation (4.21)-(4.24) and summarize as


























By using Equation (4.50) and Lemma 4.2.3-4.2.6 and 4.3.4 , we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.3.1 (Case I) In equilibrium, under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.7 and 4.3.1-4.3.2,
(i) The larger short positions of dealers lead to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures
return, and a higher V IX2 futures price (equivalently, higher V IX2 futures basis).
(ii) The larger short positions of leveraged funds lead to less negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a lower V IX2 futures price.
(iii) The larger long positions of asset managers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a higher V IX2 futures price.
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The results in Proposition 4.3.1 are same as the results (i)-(iii) in Proposition 4.2.1.
Thus, the economic mechanism is the same as in Section 4.2.5. Here, we are inter-
ested in how risk aversion, risk-averse heterogeneity, investment horizon and the
hedging demand of assert managers affect the VRP, the V IX2 futures return and the
level of the V IX2 futures price.
Figure 4.2: The value of λ in Case I.
This figure shows the value of λ. The benchmark model parameters are as follows: ρ =
−0.75, σv = 0.5, µ = 0.06, vt = 0.22, T − t = 1, γ = 2, δ = 2 and ψtSt = 1.










×10-3 Panel A: Sensitivity to risk-averse heterogeneity














Panel B: Sensitivity to risk aversion














×10-3 Panel C: Sensitivity to investment horizon














Panel D: Sensitivity to the initial wealth of asset managers in stocks
Panel A in Figure 4.2 shows higher risk-averse heterogeneity leads to less neg-
ative λ, which means the less negative VRP and V IX2 futures return, and lower
V IX2 futures price, while Panel B-D in Figure 4.2 shows that the higher risk aver-
sion of dealers (or total social risk aversion), shorter horizon and larger hedging
demand of assert managers generate more negative λ. We summarize these results
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in the following proportion.
Proposition 4.3.2 (Case I) In equilibrium, under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.7 and 4.3.1-4.3.2,
(i) Higher risk-averse heterogeneity leads to a less negative VRP and V IX2 futures re-
turn, and a lower V IX2 futures price.
(ii) The larger risk aversion of dealers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures
return, and a higher V IX2 futures price (equivalently, higher V IX2 futures basis).
(iii) The shorter investment horizon leads to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures return,
and a higher V IX2 futures price.
(iv) The larger hedging demand of assert managers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a higher V IX2 futures price.
4.3.2 Case II: Two-market equilibrium with endogenous trading strate-
gies
In this case, we take Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.8 and 4.3.1 and then we have one more
unknown, i.e., b, so that the equilibrium in the stock market has to be defined, in
order to determine the additional unknown b.16 The behaviours of traders are same
as in Case I, except for asset managers’ trading activities in the stock market. Thus,
the optimal positions in V IX2 futures of leveraged funds is same as (4.41), and the
optimal portfolios of dealers in V IX2 futures and stocks are same as (4.29) and (3.40).
Asset managers choose both the optimal order ψt in stocks and zt in V IX2 futures






V art(WA,T ). (4.51)
16Actually, xt, yt, zt and ψt are all endogenous in this case.
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Here, in the volatility market, asset managers are hedgers and dealers are the market
makers, while, in the stock market, asset managers are the market makers (clearing
the stock market) and dealers are hedgers (hedging their long or short position in
V IX2 futures). Leveraged funds only speculate in the volatility market.
Similarly, we can solve the optimal order ψt in stocks and zt in V IX2 futures as
zt =
λt(T − t)− γAψtStCovt[RT , vT ]




Et[RT ]− ztγACovt[RT , vT ]× 1002
γAStV art[RT ]
. (4.53)
The definition of the equilibrium in volatility and stock markets is given as follows.
Definition 4.3.2 (Two-market equilibrium) Equilibrium in our economy is defined in
a standard way: Equilibrium V IX2 futures orders xt, yt, zt and stock orders φt and ψt
maximize all traders’ mean-variance preferences, and V IX2 futures and stock markets clear,
i.e., xt + yt + zt = 0 and φt + ψt = Z, where Z is the total amount of stocks.17
Based on Definition 4.3.2, we summarize the equilibrium as the following system.
17In a more general case, Z can be regarded as the remainder of the total supply traded by purely-
stock-trading traders.
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Theorem 4.3.5 (Case II) Under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.8 and 4.3.1, the equilibrium solu-
tions can be solved from the following system,

λt = axt + b,
xt =
b(T−t)−γDφtStCovt[RT ,vT ]
γDV art[vT ]×1002−2a(T−t) ,
φtSt =





γLV art[vT ]×1002 ,
zt =
λt(T−t)−γAψtStCovt[RT ,vT ]
γAV art[vT ]×1002 ,
ψtSt =
Et[RT ]−ztγACovt[RT ,vT ]×1002
γAV art[RT ]
,
xt + yt + zt = 0,
φtSt + ψtSt = ZSt.
(4.54)
The analytical solutions are provided in Appendix 4.6.2.
The equilibrium system (3.10) has eight equations with six unknowns a, b, λt,
xt, yt, zt, φtSt and ψtSt. Given parameters vt, T − t, µ, ρ, σv, ZSt, γD, γL and γA,
we can easily solve them (see Appendix 4.6.2). Similarly, we set ρ = −0.75, σv =
0.5, µ = 0.06, vt = 0.2
2, T − t = 1, γ = 2, δ = 2 and ZSt = 1. Then we have
a = 21.53 > 0, b = −0.012 < 0, λt = −0.010 < 0, xt = 0.78 × 10−4 > 0, yt =
−1.05 × 10−4 < 0, zt = 0.027 × 10−4 > 0, φtSt = 0.69 and ψtSt = 0.31. We find
that, in this model, the positive xt = 1.12 × 10−4 > 0 can produce the negative
λt = −0.012 < 0. This is consistent with the position data in our chapter (i.e., Table
4.1) and Mixon and Onur (2015).
We analyse the sensitivities of a and b against other parameters in Figure 4.3,
which shows that the value of a is always positive and the value of b is always
negative. So, under reasonable parameter settings, the value of a can be always
positive, while b can be always negative. The signs of them are same as the signs in
the exogenous case (i.e., Equation (4.33) and (4.34)).
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Figure 4.3: The value of parameter a in Case II.
This figure shows the value of a. The benchmark model parameters are as follows: ρ =
−0.75, σv = 0.5, µ = 0.06, vt = 0.22, T − t = 1, γ = 2, δ = 2 and ZSt = 1.





































































In this model, the sign of λ is determined by not only the positions of dealers in
V IX2 futures, but also the value of b, which measures the impacts of the position in
stocks. This explains why the positive xt can produce the negative λt.
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Figure 4.4: The value of λ in Case II.
This figure shows the value of λ. The benchmark model parameters are as follows: ρ =
−0.75, σv = 0.5, µ = 0.06, vt = 0.22, T − t = 1, γ = 2, δ = 2 and ZSt = 1.











×10-3 Panel A: Sensitivity to risk-averse heterogeneity











Panel B: Sensitivity to risk aversion










Panel C: Sensitivity to investment horizon











Panel D: Sensitivity to the total wealth in stocks
The effects in Figure 4.4 are similar to Figure 4.3, except the investment hori-
zon. In Panel C, Figure 4.4, a longer horizon leads to more negative λt. We get the
following proposition, which is the same as Proposition 4.3.2.
Proposition 4.3.3 (Case II) In equilibrium, under Assumption 4.2.1-4.2.8 and 4.3.1,
(i) The higher risk-averse heterogeneity most likely leads to less negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a lower V IX2 futures price.
(ii) The larger the risk aversion of dealers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures
return, and a higher V IX2 futures price (equivalently, higher V IX2 futures basis).
(iii) The longer investment horizon leads to more negative VRP and V IX2 futures return,
and a higher V IX2 futures price.
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(iv) The larger hedging demand of asset managers leads to more negative VRP and V IX2
futures return, and a higher V IX2 futures price.
4.4 Empirical analysis
In this section, first, Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2016) test the trading activity
model by using the trading volume of all S&P 500 futures contracts and the TED
spread (which measures traders funding liquidity), while we extend the model with
the net positions of dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds, which reveals the
relation between the VRP and the net positions of three main traders. Second, in-
spired by Eraker and Wu (2017), we newly investigate the impact of the net posi-
tions on the VIX futures return. Finally, we empirically study the results in Mixon
and Onur (2015) by using obtainable data.18
Based on Proposition 4.2.1, we propose the following six hypothesises:
(i-a) VRP is positively related to the level of positioning by dealers.
(i-b) VRP is negatively related to the level of positioning by asset managers and
leveraged funds.
(ii-a) VIX futures return is positively related to the level of positioning by dealers.
(ii-b) VIX futures return is negatively related to the level of positioning by asset man-
agers and leveraged funds.
(iii-a) VIX futures basis is negatively related to the level of positioning by dealers.
(iii-b) VIX futures basis is positively related to the level of positioning by asset man-
agers and leveraged funds.
18The daily trading data used in Mixon and Onur (2015) is not available to the public. Thus, we
have to use weekly data to test our model. Our empirical results are consistent with Mixon and Onur
(2015).
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Hypothesis (i-a) and (i-b) are designed to explicitly explain the observation in Kon-
stantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2016); hypothesis (ii-a) and (ii-b) are extended from
Eraker and Wu (2017); and hypothesis (i-a) and (i-b) correspond to the empirical
findings in Mixon and Onur (2015).
4.4.1 Data
CFTC began to publish weekly TFF reports on 4 September 2009 to add further trans-
parency to the financial futures markets, together with the disaggregated data in the
CFTC’s weekly COT reports. Supporting the legacy COT reports, the TFF reports
provide a breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest for markets in which 20 or
more traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the
CFTC and separates large traders in the financial markets into the following four
categories: dealers, asset managers, leveraged funds and other reportables.19 We
download TFF Futures Only Reports weekly data from the CFTC website.20 The
available time period is from 13 June 2006 to 25 Oct 2016.
The TFF reports disclose the long and short open interest for four categories.
We are interested in their net positions in VIX futures. So, we convert the long and
short open interest variables into net positions, which are defined as the long open
interest minus the short open interest. Here the net positions are the total aggregated
open interest in VIX futures across different maturities for each type of trader. The
statistics are given in Table 4.1.
19TFF Explanatory Notes can be found at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/ @commit-
mentsoftraders/documents/file/tfmexplanatorynotes.pdf.
20See http://www.cftc.gov/marketreports/commitmentsoftraders/historicalcompressed/index.htm.
Variable names for TFF reports are introduced in http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/ Commit-
mentsofTraders/HistoricalViewable/cotvariablestfm.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics on net positions.
We report the summary statistics of net positions of the different types of traders. NP i
where i = d, am, lf, or represents the net positions of dealers, asset managers, leveraged
funds and other reportables. The time period is from 13 June 2006 to 25 October 2016.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NP d 26,031.73 46,864.47 -58,735 144,190
NP am 16,056.04 19,204.95 -13,396 90,706
NP lf -40,255.67 755,660.03 -195,486 63,753
NP or -1,235.41 7,186.36 -38,950 33,621
Table 4.1 shows that the sum of the average net positions of asset manager and
leveraged funds is 24199.63, which is close to the average net position of dealers,
26031.73. The average net position of other reportables is very small, around 3%
of leveraged funds. Thus, contributions from other reportables can be omitted. In
addition, Table 4.1 documents that we have to consider at least three main traders in
the equilibrium instead of using the two-trader equilibrium model in Garleanu et al.
(2009); Dong (2016). Our equilibrium model is more realistic than others.
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Figure 4.5: Net positioning in VIX futures by asset managers,
leveraged funds, and dealers.
The figure displays the net positions, aggregated within each of the dealers, asset managers
and leveraged funds. NP i where i = d, am, lf, or represents the net positions of dealers,
asset managers, leveraged funds and other reportables. The time period is from 13 June




















Furthermore, from Figure 4.5, the trading in VIX futures is not very active before
2012. In order to make an easy comparison with the empirical results in Mixon and
Onur (2015), we consider the last four years trading data, i.e., from 23 October 2012
to 25 October 2016.
We download VIX, S&P 500 index and VIX futures daily data from Bloomberg.
As the TFF reports provide only the total open interest of VIX futures markets held
by the three main traders across different maturity contracts, we examine only the
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futures basis for the first and second nearest futures contracts, which are the most
active. Table 4.2 also supports our treatment. The average open interest of the first
and second nearest VIX futures is two times more than the rest of contracts.
Table 4.2: Open interest of VIX futures across different matu-
rities.
We report the summary statistics of open interest of VIX futures across different maturities
(first six maturities). The time period is from 23 October 2012 to 25 October 2016.
Contract Expiry Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 142,654.0 46,600.07 44,360 295,871
2 111,317.4 45,966.74 32,357 295,930
3 43,304.3 12,214.04 16,890 95,476
4 31,663.4 7,533.20 14,389 56,336
5 25,618.2 7,035.65 9,940 47,991
6 18,398.0 5,298.13 7,609 35,450
Following Mixon and Onur (2015), we calculate the daily futures basis as
Basisit = Price future
i
t − V IXt (4.55)
where Price futureit is VIX futures last price at date t for the first nearest (i = 1) and
the second nearest (i = 2).21 In addition, according to Bollerslev et al. (2009) and
González-Urteaga and Rubio (2016), the daily VRP is defined as
V RP t→t+21t = RV
t→t+21
t − V IX2t , (4.56)
where RV t→t+21t is calculated as the variance of the daily percentage returns of the
S&P 500 over 21-day windows at day t; V IX2t is the daily squared VIX index divided
21We only consider the last price because the settlement price is the same as the last price in the VIX
futures data downloaded from Bloomberg.
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by 12 as one-month horizon at time t.
Now we merge the daily Basisit and V RPt with weekly net position data and
then we calculate the weekly returns of VIX futures i,









Finally, we provide summary statistics for all of the variables in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics on all variables.
We report the summary statistics of variables in weekly frequency. The time period is from
23 October 2012 to 25 October 2016.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Basis1 0.58 1.13 -10.70 2.66
Basis2 1.46 1.83 -13.47 4.50
V IX 15.43 3.54 10.99 36.02
V RP t→t+21t -6.64 13.33 -56.54 64.91
NP lf -74,160.72 61,307.91 -195,486 63,753
NP am 29,727.25 20,625.31 -13,396 90,706
NP d 48,697.36 52,010.26 -58,735 144,190
Ret future1 -0.0011152 0.11429 -0.37194 0.57328
Ret future2 -0.0008592 0.07553 -0.18382 0.39609
In Table 4.3, the average future basis is positive and the means of the VRP and
the futures return are negative, which implies that the market price of the volatility
risk λ in our model should be negative in the real world. The mean of leveraged
funds’ net positions is negative and that of asset managers’ net positions is positive.
This is consistent with our model assumptions in Section 4.2.4. Using the weekly
data, we are able to analyse the impact of trading on futures basis, the VRP and the
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VIX futures return.
4.4.2 Empirical results: the impact of trading on VRP
Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2016) compare the predictive ability of four mod-
els and conclude that the trading activity model is the best to predict the VRP. They
claim that the greater VRP is due to dealers’ greater short positions in index options.
However, their trading activity variables are the trading volume of all S&P 500 fu-
tures contracts and the TED spread. They do not explicitly test the impacts of the net
positions of dealers, asset managers and leveraged funds on the VRP. To fill this gap,
we further develop their trading activity model into a VIX futures trading model by
using the net positions of the three main traders. Then we are able to investigate the
impacts of volatility trading activities on the VRP. Corresponding to Konstantinidi
and Skiadopoulos (2016), we run the following regressions:22
V RP t→t+21t = α+ β1NP dt + εt, Hypothesis (i-a) (4.58)
and
V RP t→t+21t = α+ β1NP am+ β2NP lft + εt, Hypothesis (i-b). (4.59)
In contrast to the impact of trading on futures basis, based on (4.36), the sign of
the coefficient β signifies whether the VRP is positively (negatively) related to the
level of positioning by dealers (asset managers and leveraged funds). The results
are given in Table 4.4.
22The better way to examine the impact of volatility trading on VRP is to use S&P 500 variance
swaps trading data for the three major traders and to calculate the VRP based on variance swaps rates.
However, the data are unobtainable.
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Table 4.4: Results from regressing VRP on dealer and non-
dealer VIX futures positions.
The table displays estimation results for the regressions in Equation (4.58) shown in Panel
A and in Equation (4.59) shown in Panel B. T-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987)
standard errors with 3 Newey-West lags. The regressions are estimated on weekly data
spanning the period 23 October 2012 to 25 October 2016. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Panel A




NP am (×10−5) NP lf (×10−5) Cons. Adj. R2 (%)
-8.86 -5.19∗ -7.84∗∗∗
(-1.07) (-1.83) (-2.89) 2.18
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows that the coefficient is significantly positive. In other
words, the VRP is positively related to the level of positioning by dealers. The larger
the short position of dealers, the more negative the VRP. Panel B shows that both the
coefficients are negative, where the coefficient of leveraged funds’ net positions is
significantly negative. Similarly, we can empirically conclude that the VRP is nega-
tively related to the level of positioning by asset managers and leveraged funds. The
larger long positions of asset managers in VIX futures lead to more negative VRP,
while the larger short positions of leveraged funds lead to the more negative VRP.
All results correspond to Proposition 4.2.1 in this chapter.
Our demand-based equilibrium model provides a channel to explain the high
negative VRP. Based on our empirical and theoretical results, the high negative VRP
is driven by the large hedging demand of asset managers in VIX futures to hedge
the underlyings they hold. It is very intuitive that the buyers of volatility derivatives
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are willing to pay some risk premium (i.e., −V RP ) to protect their long positions in
underlyings. On the other hand, if leveraged funds increase (decrease) their short
position, the supply of volatility derivatives will increase (decrease), so that volatil-
ity derivatives buyers are willing to pay less (more) to buy these derivatives. This is
why the VRP decreases with a short position of leveraged funds.
The large negative mean of the VRP is mainly captured by the constant term α
in Regression (4.58) and (4.59), which essentially is the solution b in our benchmark
model. Table 4.4 shows that the constants are significantly negative with a large
magnitude. Based on Equation (4.34), we know that the negative sign of b comes
from the negative correlation between the stock return and its volatility. Therefore,
we observe that the large negative VRP is caused by the volatility trading activities
and the negative correlation between the stock return and its volatility. Actually,
due to the negative correlation, volatility derivatives provide a channel for investors
to hedge the position in the stock market or speculate the position in the volatility
market.
4.4.3 Empirical results: the impact of trading on VIX futures return
In order to investigate the impact of trading on the VIX futures return, we run the
following regressions,
Ret futureit = α
i + βi1NP dt + εt, Hypothesis (ii-a) (4.60)
and
Ret futureit = α
i + βi1NP am+ β
i
2NP lft + εt, Hypothesis (ii-b). (4.61)
Consistent with Eraker and Wu (2017), the negative VIX futures return is con-
temporaneously related to the negative VRP. The results in Table 4.5 are similar to
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the results in Table 4.4. In other words, the VIX futures return and the VRP are posi-
tively (negatively) related to the level of positioning by dealers (asset managers and
leveraged funds); see Proposition 4.2.1-4.3.1. The larger the short position of dealers,
the more negative the return of VIX futures (see Panel A of Table 4.5). In addition,
the larger long positions of asset managers in VIX futures lead to more negative re-
turn, while the large short positions of leveraged funds lead to the more negative
return (see Panel B of Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: Results from regressing VIX futures return on VIX
and dealer and non-dealer VIX futures positions.
The table displays estimation results for the regressions in Equation (4.60) shown in Panel
A and in Equation (4.61) shown in Panel B. Regressions are estimated separately for each
contract ( i = 1 and 2). T-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with
3 Newey-West lags. The regressions are estimated on weekly data spanning the period 23
October 2012 to 25 October 2016. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and
10% level.
Panel A
Contract Expiry NP d (×10−7) Cons. (×10−2) Adj. R2 (%)
1 2.50∗∗ 1.32 0.81
(2.32) (-1.43)
2 1.06 0.60 0.05
(1.34) (-0.91)
Panel B
Contract Expiry NP am (×10−7) NP lf (×10−7) Cons. (×10−3) Adj. R2 (%)
1 -7.57∗ -3.54∗∗∗ 4.75 0.94
(-1.88) (-2.80) (-0.39)
2 -3.51 -1.55∗ 1.87 0.13
(-1.36) (-1.75) (-0.22)
Our demand-based equilibrium model very intuitively explains the mechanism.
Chapter 4. A Demand-Based Equilibrium Model of Volatility Trading 143
As hedgers, the high demand of asset managers in volatility derivatives acts to in-
crease the prices of volatility derivatives and make the returns more negative. On
the other hand, the leveraged funds, as speculators, selling (shorting) more volatility
derivatives brings a high supply, so that the prices of volatility derivatives decrease
and their returns become less negative. The balance of the supply and demand de-
termines the prices of volatility derivatives and their returns.
4.4.4 Empirical results: the impact of trading on futures basis
In order to test whether the VIX futures (i.e., VIX futures basis) varies according to
the level of different types of traders’ net positions in VIX futures, following Mixon
and Onur (2015), we run the following regressions:
Basisi = αi + ηiV IX + βi1NP d+ ε
i, Hypothesis (iii-a) (4.62)
and
Basisi = αi + ηiV IX + βi1NP am+ β
i
2NP lf + ε
i, Hypothesis (iii-b). (4.63)
The signs of the coefficient βi signifies whether the futures price (equivalently, the
futures price basis) is negatively (positively) related to the level of positioning by
dealers (asset managers and leveraged funds). The results are given in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: Results from regressing VIX futures basis on VIX
and dealer and non-dealer VIX futures positions.
The table displays estimation results for the regressions in Equation (4.62) shown in Panel
A and in Equation (4.63) shown in Panel B. Regressions are estimated separately for each
contract (i = 1 and 2). T-statistics are based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors with
3 Newey-West lags. The regressions are estimated on weekly data spanning the period 23
October 2012 to 25 October 2016. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and
10% level.
Panel A
Contract Expiry V IX NP d (×10−6) Cons. Adj. R2 (%)
1 -0.24∗∗∗ -5.50∗∗∗ 4.61∗∗∗ 47.52
(-4.30) (-2.82) (5.04)
2 -0.44∗∗∗ -1.66 8.34∗∗∗ 69.28
(-7.36) (-0.61) (8.53)
Panel B
Contract Expiry V IX NP am (×10−5) NP lf (×10−6) Cons. Adj. R2 (%)
1 -0.23∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗ 7.56∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗∗ 50.97
(-4.09 ) (4.28) (3.89) (4.43)
2 -0.42∗∗∗ 3.49∗∗∗ 6.54∗∗∗ 7.35∗∗∗ 77.45
(-7.20) (6.39) (2.73) (7.55)
The results in both Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.6 are consistent with Mixon
and Onur (2015), even though we use weekly data. Panel A shows that the coef-
ficient is significantly negative for the first nearest futures contracts. Even though
the coefficient of the second nearest contracts is not significant, the sign is negative.
Thus, we can see the futures basis is negatively related to the level of positioning
by dealers. In Panel B, the coefficients of asset managers and leveraged funds net
positions for the first and second nearest contracts are all significantly positive. This
means that the futures basis is positively related to the level of positioning by asset
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managers and leveraged funds. As on average, the asset managers net positions are
positive and leveraged funds net positions are negative, the larger long positions of
asset managers act to bring about higher VIX futures prices, while the larger short
positions of leveraged funds act to lower VIX futures prices. Our empirical results
are consistent with Proposition 4.2.1-4.3.1 and Mixon and Onur (2015).
4.5 Conclusion
We provide a very neat demand-based equilibrium model of volatility trading, which
reveals an intuitive economic mechanism of how asset managers, leveraged funds
and dealers’ volatility trading activities affect the volatility market. Our model
complements Eraker and Wu’s (2017) consumption-based equilibrium model. After
solving the equilibrium, we get several theoretical results which are consistent with
the empirical tests in Mixon and Onur (2015) and the observation in Konstantinidi
and Skiadopoulos (2016). Our empirical tests significantly support the theoretical
results implied by our equilibrium model. As this is the first paper to model the
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As vt is a martingale (see Equation (4.7)), i.e., Et[vu] = vt for u > t, Equation (4.64)
therefore can be simplified as
Et[RT ] = µ(T − t)−
1
2
vt(T − t). (4.65)




vsdBV,s for u > t, we have
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∫ T
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Et[vT ] = vt, (4.66)
and







= σ2vvt(T − t). (4.67)
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Furthermore, we calculate the conditional covariance between RT and vT as



































By using the conditions, −1 < ρ < 0 and 0 < σv < 1, under mild conditions (e.g.,
T − t is relatively small), we have
|Covt[RT , vT ]| < vt(T − t) < V art[RT ]. (4.68)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis mainly studies three classes of equilibrium models and their applications.
In Chapter 2, we study a consumption-based equilibrium model built in a pure ex-
change economy in which there are two types of investors, with lower and higher
risk aversion, each with CRRA utility. The equilibrium is completely solved by us-
ing perturbation methods. Taking advantage of the tractability of our solutions, we
analyse the effect of the size of investors and the effect of the risk-aversion hetero-
geneity and discuss the economic mechanism implied by our solutions.
In Chapter 3, in contrast to Bollerslev et al. (2009); Drechsler and Yaron (2011);
Drechsler (2013), who use a long-run risks model, and Buraschi et al. (2014) who
use a two-tree Lucas (1978) economy with two heterogeneous investors, we employ
a simpler cost-free production-based equilibrium model to explain the large equity
and variance risk premiums. For the data period in Broadie et al. (2007), the SVCJ
model built in our cost-free production economy can perfectly explain the equity
premium puzzle and the large negative VRP. For the longer data period, the SVJV
model works best in terms of explaining the VRP, and we find that the SVJV and
SVCJ models are able to explain both large ERP and VRP when the ERP is larger
than 11% (e.g., the periods, 1990–1999 and 2010–2016).
In Chapter 4, we provide an equilibrium model, which is the first demand-based
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equilibrium model of volatility trading with three kinds of traders (i.e., dealers, as-
set managers and leveraged funds). It reveals an intuitive economic mechanism of
how asset managers, leveraged funds and dealers’ volatility trading activities affect
the volatility market and fully supports the existing empirical results. The empirical
results significantly support the theoretical results, which are implied by our equilib-
rium model. Finally, this chapter newly studies the impact of the three main traders




A list of research output during the
PhD period
In addition to the three essays included in this thesis, I have also published two
papers and completely finished seven working papers during the PhD period from
2014 to 2017 as follows.
[1] Ruan, Xinfeng, Wenli Zhu, Jiexiang Huang, and Jin E. Zhang, 2016, Equilibrium
Asset Pricing under the Lévy Process with Stochastic Volatility and Moment Risk
Premiums, Economic Modelling, 54, 326-338.
[2] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2016, Investor Attention and Market Microstruc-
ture, Economics Letters, 149, 125-130.
[3] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2016, Heterogeneous Beliefs on the Proportion
of Insiders.
Paper [3] is the first studying Kyle’s (1985) model with heterogeneous beliefs
on the proportion of insiders. As the proportion of insiders in the market is
unknown, the extension is more realistic. Paper [3] therefore investigates how
heterogeneous beliefs on the proportion of insiders affect the equilibrium.
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[4] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2016, A Production Economy with Shocks in
the Volatility of Stock Capital and Its Application.
Paper [4] extends Pindyck and Wang (2013) into a production economy with
shocks in the volatility of capital stock. In the last decade, the variance risk
premium (VRP) in the US financial markets has generated strong interest among
academic researchers. As an application, we employ the production-based asset
pricing model to successfully explain the higher negative VRP.
[5] Frömmel, Michael, Xing Han, and Xinfeng Ruan, 2017, The Price of Liquidity
Beta in China: A Sentiment-based Explanation, Paper presented at 2017 FMA
Annual Meeting.
Paper [5] studies the price of liquidity beta in China. The conventional, risk-
based view on liquidity beta is a dismal story for China: High liquidity beta
stocks underperform low liquidity beta stocks by 1.17% per month in China.
We propose a competing, sentiment-based explanation on the reversed pricing
pattern and find that liquidity beta is a negative return predictor at the firm level
and the return differential between high and low liquidity beta stocks is more
dramatic following high market liquidity periods.
[6] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2017, Ambiguity on Uncertainty: A Resolution
of the Equity Premium Puzzle.
Paper [6] considers an asset pricing model with a multiple-priors recursive util-
ity incorporating decision makers’ concern with ambiguity on the drift and the
jumps of driving process. In the last 30 years, the equity premium puzzle in the
US financial markets has generated strong interest among academic researchers.
The model in this paper can well explain the equity premium puzzle, since the
ambiguity aversion, as a complementary aversion of risk aversion, can increase
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the equity premium and decrease the risk-free rate, which documents that am-
biguity on uncertainty is a resolution of the equity premium puzzle.
[7] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2017, Risk-Neutral Moments and Cumulants
in the Crude Oil Market.
Paper [7] comprehensively studies the risk-neutral moments and cumulants in
the crude oil market. The crude oil market has become the most active energy
market in terms of trading volume and the variety of derivative products. Paper
[7] calculates the innovations in the risk-neutral moments (i.e., volatility, skew-
ness and kurtosis) and the third and fourth order cumulants and investigates
the predictability of stock and option returns in time series and cross-sectional
levels.
[8] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2017, Market Moment Spreads and the Cross
Section of Expected Returns: Evidence from the Energy Sector.
Paper [8] newly investigates the predictability of market moment spreads in the
cross section of expected returns, taking the case of the energy stock market,
which is highly correlated to energy commodity markets and essentially impor-
tant for the development of a country. Paper [8] is the first to study the pre-
dictability of market moment spreads in the energy stock sector.
[9] Ruan, Xinfeng, and Jin E. Zhang, 2017, The Cross-Sectional Variation of Skew
Risk Premia.
Paper [9] estimates the skew risk premia for the individual stocks and indexes
in the US financial markets and analyzes the determinants of the cross-sectional
variation of skew risk premia. Due to the prosperity of the variance swaps mar-
ket and the needs of skew swap to speculate or hedge the skewness risk, study-
ing skew swaps becomes much more important. Paper [9] is the first to provide
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a comprehensive study of the cross-sectional variation of skew risk premia and
their determinants.
For more details, see my homepage: sites.google.com/site/ruanxinf.
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